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ABSTRACT
The sharing economy—the rapidly evolving sector of peer-to-peer home- 
sharing and ride-hailing transactions facilitated by platforms like Airbnb 
and Uber—offers the potential for economic growth, greater sustainability, and
expanded access for underserved groups.  But the massive number of small- 
scale activities that these platforms facilitate also causes negative cumulative
impacts and exposes regulatory fractures, from the loss of long-term 
rental housing to discrimination against protected classes to increased
burdens on public infrastructure.
This Article contends that scale is a defining feature and fundamental 
challenge of the sharing economy.  Small may be beautiful, but when
everything is small, the regulatory challenge is immense.  Small-scale activities 
that once fit the criteria for light or no regulation are occurring at scales
at which non-regulation makes little sense.  As the sharing economy becomes
an increasingly large segment of the public accommodations and transportation
markets, the traditional ways we distinguish between activities that we should 
regulate and those we treat with regulatory leniency no longer fit. Existing
regulatory systems, from civil rights and environmental law to consumer
protection and tax law, do not map neatly onto the configuration of
scale in the sharing economy. This regulatory misfit threatens to result 
in inequitable and discriminatory outcomes across the sharing economy.
Effective governance of the sharing economy requires a more complete
understanding of the role of scale. This Article investigates the implications 
of scale in the sharing economy, focusing on the prominent sectors of home- 
sharing and ride-hailing. The Article begins by exploring governance of
small-scale activities, unpacking why regulatory systems tend to treat 
small-scale activities with reduced stringency and how increasing numbers 
can shift the governance response.  It then analyzes the implications of 
scale in the sharing economy, examining how massive numbers of home-
sharing and ride-hailing activities produce negative cumulative impacts 
and expose regulatory fractures, which threaten to undermine a range of 
important public policies—including affordable housing, civil rights, and
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consumer protection. The Article concludes by considering possible legal 
regimes for responding to scale, such as co-regulation, aggregate regulation,
and cooperative models.
INTRODUCTION
“At the most macro level, I think we’re going to go back to the 
village . . . everything will be small.”1 
The sharing economy—epitomized by home-sharing company Airbnb
and ride-hailing companies Uber and Lyft—is big.2  While the underlying 
activities are not new—people have long rented rooms to boarders, used 
gypsy cabs, and carpooled—platforms like Uber and Airbnb make it possible
for strangers to engage in these kinds of transactions on a massive scale.3 
Airbnb has more listings for short-term accommodation than the world’s
largest hotel chains.4  Uber has provided more than one billion rides worldwide
1. Uri Friedman, Airbnb CEO: Cities Are Becoming Villages,ATLANTIC (June 29,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/airbnb-ceo-cities-are­
becoming-villages/373676/ [https://perma.cc/DRX6-LPHR] (quoting Brian Chesky, CEO
of Airbnb).
2. This Article adopts the approach of the AP Stylebook and uses the term “ride­
hailing” rather than ride-sharing to describe the services of companies like Uber and Lyft.
See AP Stylebook (@APStylebook), TWITTER (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:21 AM), https://twitter. 
com/apstylebook/status/565515953430364163 [https://perma.cc/DC7F-7FYY] (“Ride-hailing
or ride-booking services let people use smartphone apps to book and pay for car service. 
Do not use ride-sharing.”). 
3. While I use the term “sharing economy” throughout this Article because it is
the most prevalent term used to talk about companies like Airbnb and Uber, it is worth
acknowledging at the outset that much of the activity occurring in the sharing economy is 
not the type of gratuitous activity many of us instinctively associate with the word
“sharing.” Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 514–15 (2016).  A
more accurate description thus might be the “sharing-for-profit economy.”  Id. at 527. 
4. Vicki Stern et al., Hotels: Is Airbnb a Game-Changer?, BARCLAYS, Jan. 16, 
2015, at 1, 4, 13 (reporting that Airbnb is predicted to double in market share in the next
twelve months and already has a twenty percent share of “hotel” rooms in New York City);
see also Gregory Ferenstein, Uber and Airbnb’s Incredible Growth in Four Charts,
VENTUREBEAT (June 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/06/19/uber-and­
airbnbs-incredible-growth-in-4-charts/ [https://perma.cc/89YH-XN9A] (charting Airbnb’s
listings growth from 50,000 in 2011 to 550,000 in 2014).  Airbnb’s gross bookings in 2014
were estimated at over $4 billion and its revenues at $423 million.  See Rafat Ali, Airbnb’s 
Revenues Will Cross Half Billion Mark in 2015, Analysts Estimate, SKIFT (Mar. 25, 2015, 
7:00 AM) (citing Michael J. Olson & Samuel J. Kemp, Sharing Economy: An In-Depth

























   
     
 








    
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
and has a greater market share than taxis in a growing number of cities.5 
Almost half of all U.S. residents have participated in some aspect of the 
sharing economy.6  Airbnb and Uber have two of the three highest valuations
of venture-backed private corporations globally.7 
Yet despite these big numbers, the sharing economy has staked its
identity on smallness.  Uber’s tagline is “Everyone’s private driver.”8  Lyft’s
slogan is “Your friend with a car.”9  Airbnb says its “greatest achievements 
aren’t monumental . . . . They’re the small, meaningful connections that 
happen between us every day.”10  And whether it’s called the sharing 
P84D-PMA9]), http://skift.com/2015/03/25/airbnbs-revenues-will-cross-half-billion-mark-in­
2015-analysts-estimate/ [https://perma.cc/PDC3-ZV2Z]. 
5. See Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber Completes One Billion Rides, FORTUNE (Dec. 30,
2015, 7:22 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/12/30/uber-completes-1-billion-rides/ [https://
perma.cc/CC5D-GR87] (discussing Uber exceeding one billion rides); Andrew Bender, 
Uber’s Astounding Rise: Overtaking Taxis in Key Markets, FORBES: TRAVEL (Apr. 10,
2015, 11:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2015/04/10/ubers-astounding­
rise-overtaking-taxis-in-key-markets/#5285824322ef [https://perma.cc/CPW6-PBBX] 
(discussing Uber’s market share in key markets); see also Henry Blodget, Uber CEO
Reveals Mind-Boggling New Statistic that Skeptics Will Hate, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2015, 
4:04 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-san-francisco-2015-1 [https:// 
perma.cc/6GX6-SRAS] (discussing Uber’s annual revenues of $500 million in San
Francisco, which exceed that of the city’s traditional taxi market).  Ride-sharing numbers 
for companies in other countries are similarly stunning. See Anthony Kuhn, In China, a
Battle Uber Didn’t Win, NPR (Aug. 3, 2016, 4:50 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/
2016/08/03/488477289/in-china-a-battle-uber-didnt-win [https://perma.cc/WR25-X6S8]
(describing Didi, China’s largest ride-hailing service: “It gives 15 million rides a day, and
has 300 million registered users—almost the population of the U.S.”). 
6. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 
6, 2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/ [https://perma.cc/76RZ-GWNK];
see also Jennifer Rossa, The Sharing Economy: The Workers, BLOOMBERG BRIEF (June
15, 2015), https://newsletters.briefs.bloomberg.com/document/4vz1acbgfrxz8uwan9/the­
workers-demographics [https://perma.cc/9QGZ-ERBH]; Sarah Treuhaft, Can We Bend 
the Sharing Economy Toward Equity?, POLICYLINK: EQUITY BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.policylink.org/blog/can-we-bend-the-sharing-economy-toward-equity . . . [https:// 
perma.cc/5F3G-7JH6] (“. . . 34 percent of workers, or 53 million Americans, are freelancing to
make a living, and that share is expected to grow to 40 percent by 2020.”).  Participation
rates in the sharing economy in some other countries are even higher.  For example, over
sixty percent of U.K. adults have participated in the sharing economy.  See Patrick Penzo, 
The UK Government and the Sharing Economy, ONFIDO (Apr. 2, 2015), http://blog.onfido.
com/uk-government-sharing-economy/[https://perma.cc/WN7R-WYNH].
7. See Scott Austin et al., The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18,
2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/ [https://perma.cc/T6JL-UPDS] (listing
Uber’s valuation as $68.0 billion and Airbnb’s as $25.5 billion as of September 2016). 
8. See Aarti Shahani, In Battle Between Uber and Lyft, Focus IIs on Drivers, 89.3
KPCC (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.scpr.org/news/2016/01/18/56919/in-battle-between-
lyft-and-uber-focus-is-on-driver/[https://perma.cc/FV4Q-KMJV].
9. Id. (noting the companies’ different mottos reflect underlying differences between 
Uber and Lyft).
10. About Create Airbnb, AIRBNB, https://create.airbnb.com/en/about [https://perma.
cc/6CHT-8QBB] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
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economy, the peer-to-peer economy, or the people-powered economy,11 
the labels make us think small: “[f]raming it as ‘sharing’ or ‘peers’ is a
way of trying to keep the focus on the people who provide the services— 
and off the platforms.”12 
“Thinking small” is not just a marketing strategy.  By focusing on
smallness, platforms have tapped into a powerful framing device in the
debate over governance of the sharing economy.  If the sharing economy
is “just a way to bring two independent parties together—one to provide
a service and the other to utilize a service . . [w]hy does government need
to stick its nose into” it?13 If it is just “making the world a more connected 
and better place, one less stranger at a time,”14 then why should it “have to 
follow the same regulations as big business does”?15 
And indeed, in a wide range of legal contexts, regulatory systems treat 
small-scale activities with reduced stringency, either exempting them 
outright or subjecting them to lowered levels of regulatory oversight.16 
Small businesses benefit from preferential regulatory treatment under a 
number of federal laws, from the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA”),) to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).17  Other legal
regimes, such as patent law and copyright law, provide benefits to small­
11. See About, PEERS FOUND., http://www.thepeersfoundation.org/about/ [https://perma. 
cc/WBH8-XHJM] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (“We are the people powered economy.”).
(last visited Sept. 27, 2016). 
12. Natasha Singer, Twisting Words to Make ‘Sharing’ Apps Seem Selfless, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/technology/twisting-words­
to-make-sharing-apps-seem-selfless.html?_r=0 (quoting Erin McKean, a lexicographer).
13. Liberty For All, Comment to A World Without Uber, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2016, 
6:41 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/a-world-without-uber/487331/
#article-comments. [https://perma.cc/4TVQ-96BD]. 
14. Creating #OneLessStranger: Stories of Belonging, AIRBNB, (Jan. 1, 2015) Blog, 
http://blog.airbnb.com/creating-onelessstranger-stories-belonging/ [https://perma.cc/RQ5N-
EFYX] (last visited July 23, 2016). 
15. Sam Sanders, Rental Rules in California Raise Questions About Who’s Using 
Airbnb, NPR (May 17, 2015, 5:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/17/407529301/does­
airbnb-help-folks-by-or-help-businesses-get-sly [https://perma.cc/3GVG-482U] (quoting
a supporter of home-sharing). 
16. As used here, small-scale activities refer to those where each individual transaction 
contributes a minimal amount to the overall level of that type of activity.  See discussion
infra Section I.A.
 17. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1073 (2013) (noting that the FMLA exempts employers with fewer 
than fifty employees from its provisions, and that the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
exempts from its record keeping requirements firms with eleven or fewer employees—
which make up “more than 79% of” all firms). 
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scale actors as well, such as reduced schedules of fees for “small inventors”
under patent law,18 and the “homestyle” exemption under the Copyright
Act.19  Similar regulatory leniency for small-scale activity is evident in
environmental law, much of which targets large polluters like power plants 
and industrial factories, eschewing regulations of households and individuals.20 
Justifications for regulatory leniency for small-scale activities vary but 
include concerns about privacy, autonomy, and fairness; the de minimis 
nature of the activity; costs of enforcement; and the availability of non­
legal means to shape the behavior of small-scale actors.21  The result is
that in a variety of regulatory contexts, small-scale activities are seen as 
entrepreneurial, low-impact, and even beautiful.22 
But while small may be beautiful, when everything is small, the regulatory
challenge is immense.  Small-scale activities taking place in the sharing 
economy can potentially expand access to goods and services to previously
underserved groups, encourage more sustainable uses of resources, and 
open up new avenues of economic activity.  But the cumulative impacts 
of individually de minimis activities in the sharing economy can also lead 
to significant negative consequences, from the loss of long-term rental 
housing to discrimination against protected classes to increased burdens 
on public services and infrastructure.23 
For example, while a single ride-hailing transaction may simply substitute
one-for-one for someone otherwise driving themselves, the cumulative 
impacts of ride-hailing may be more congestion and increased emissions, 
as people who would otherwise use public transportation instead use Uber 
or Lyft, and the number of vehicles on the road increases.  Similarly, while 
a single home-sharing transaction likely has no discernable effect on a 
city’s housing market, the cumulative effects of thousands of home-sharing
transactions in a city may be reduced rental availability and increased
 18. See id. at 1076–77 (“[A] key part of the statutory patent fee structure is a two-
tier fee system, which provides small entities with discounted rates for fees required for 
application, issuance, search, and maintenance of patents”).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2016) (providing that broadcasts of copyrighted material 
on “a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes” are not liable
for infringement, unless there is a charge or it is re-transmitted to the public).
20. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as 
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 517–18
(2004) (discussing the extent to which environmental law focuses on large polluters and
not small-scale ones). 
21. See infra Section I.A, for a detailed discussion of the justifications for regulatory
leniency.
22. For a lengthy discussion and defense of this idea, see E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL
IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED (1973).
23. See infra Part II, for a further discussion on cumulative impacts. 
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rental costs, as landlords remove units from the long-term rental market 
and move them into the more profitable short-term rental market.
Furthermore, a wide range of regulations, from the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)24  to the Fair Housing Act (FHA), do not map neatly
onto the massive amounts of small-scale activity occurring in the sharing
economy.25  The resulting regulatory fractures threaten to undermine important 
public policies, such as civil rights and consumer protection, as large 
numbers of small-scale activities, facilitated by third-party platforms, fall
outside the reach of existing regulation. 
For example, mounting evidence has emerged of discrimination against 
minorities, as both guests and hosts, in the provision of short-term rentals 
on Airbnb.26  The anti-discrimination provisions of civil rights laws such 
as the Fair Housing Act and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are 
intended to ensure that people are not discriminated against because of their 
race in housing and public accommodations.27  But because these existing 
regulatory models do not align with the sharing economy’s three-sided 
model, a person discriminated against while using the services of a multi-
billion dollar company like Airbnb or Uber may have no legal recourse 
under these federal laws against either the individual who discriminated
against them or the platform that facilitated the discriminatory activity.28 
As these examples illustrate, scale in the sharing economy poses an 
institutional design challenge for regulators. As scholars have recognized 
in a range of legal contexts, from environmental law to tax law, “[i]t is 
very expensive and difficult to regulate . . . where the scale of the business
organizations is relatively small and the number of business actors is
24.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
25.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012) (FHA). 
26. See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The
Case of Airbnb.com 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014) (finding that 
“non-black hosts charge approximately 12% more than black hosts for the equivalent 
rental” when controlling for all information visible on the website); Biz Carson, Harvard 
Study Finds People with Black-Sounding Names Have a Harder Time Booking on Airbnb, 
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2015, 7:37 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-has-a-race­
problem-with-names-2015-12 [https://perma.cc/9MW4-MQ5U]. 
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of race in “public accommodations,” which include hotels, businesses, restaurants,
and other establishments whose “operations affect commerce).”).
28. See Beth J. Harpaz, Racism on Airbnb Inspires New Sites Inclusive and Noirbnb, 
WASH. TIMES (July 21, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/21/racism-at­
airbnb-inspires-new-sites-innclusive-and/ [https://perma.cc/Q5G7-9WSJ].
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large.”29  Enforcing requirements like permits for home-sharing or
fingerprinting for ride-sharing against the large numbers of small-scale
actors engaged in such activities is an almost Sisyphean task, the costs of
which likely outweigh the benefits.30 
The challenges of monitoring and enforcement are further compounded 
by the unwillingness of platforms like Airbnb and Uber, companies built
on “sharing,” to share data with regulators.  As Lawrence Lessig has put 
it, to regulate effectively, a regulator needs to know “Who did what, where?”31 
While Airbnb and Uber collect precisely this information on the millions 
of small-scale transactions occurring via their platforms, to date, they have 
largely resisted sharing this data with regulators.  While legitimate privacy 
and competition concerns exist with respect to data sharing, without a way
to determine “Who did what, where?”, the task of enacting and enforcing 
tax obligations, zoning laws, and a range of other regulations becomes a near
insurmountable one.32 
This Article contends that scale is a defining feature of the sharing economy, 
and that effective governance of the sharing economy requires a more 
complete understanding of the role of scale. The sharing economy is not 
just about what two individuals do.  It is about what millions of people are 
doing, and the cumulative impacts of those activities on affordable housing, 
public infrastructure, and civil rights.  It is about what Airbnb, Uber, and
other platforms are doing to facilitate those activities and impacts, and 
their responsibilities not only as technology companies, but also as de facto 
regulators of spare housing capacity, quasi-public transportation, and massive
amounts of data. 
The traditional ways we distinguish between activities that we should
regulate and those that should be treated with regulatory leniency, like 
the commercial–personal dichotomy, are ill-suited to an economy based
on multi-billion dollar companies facilitating individuals using personal
assets for commercial purposes. Small-scale activities that once fit criteria
for light or no regulation are now occuring at scales at which non-regulation
 29. David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability’s “Impossible Dream”: The 
Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 595, 
672–73 n.172 (2006). 
30. See Zale, supra note 3, at 512–13, 577 (discussing the San Francisco Planning 
Department’s determination that that city’s short-term rental law was “unworkable,” due 
to lack of resources and data from platforms. (citing Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, ‘No 
Way of Enforcing’ Airbnb Law, S.F. Planning Memo Says, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2015), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/No-way-ofenforcing-Airbnb-law­
S-F-planning-6151592.php [https://perma.cc/46WC-Z8T4])). 
31. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, 39 (2006). 
32. See infra notes 245–50 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the issues raised
by the use of data. 
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makes little sense, but existing regulatory models have not adapted to the 
sharing economy’s model of everything is small. 
Yet the problem of scale is not intractable.  This Article focuses on the 
two most prominent sectors of the sharing economy, home-sharing and 
ride-hailing, and proposes several governance mechanisms that can respond 
to the particular configuration of scale in the sharing economy, such as 
co-regulation, aggregate regulation, and cooperative models.  By recognizing 
platforms’ roles as aggregators of mass amounts of small-scale activity,
lawmakers can adapt regulation to fit the sharing economy’s three-sided
model and address the negative cumulative impacts of large numbers of
small-scale home-sharing and ride-hailing activities. 
Despite extensive media coverage of the sharing economy and a growing
legal literature on the subject, the role of scale in the sharing economy and 
its implications for governance have been largely overlooked.  By providing 
a comprehensive account of the regulatory challenge of scale in the sharing 
economy, this Article contributes to the literature on both the sharing economy
and governance.33  By using scale as a lens to develop a more robust
understanding of the sharing economy, this Article provides a novel
descriptive account of the sharing economy and a prescriptive framework
for recalibrating regulation to its configuration of scale.  And by using the
sharing economy as a lens to explore scale, the Article makes a normative 
contribution about the role of scale in governance and invites a broader
conversation with those engaged with other evolving technologies that 
also implicate the large-scale occurrence of small-scale activities.
This Article’s discussion of scale in the sharing economy also responds
to the exceptionalism that often underlies commentary on the sharing
economy.34  The sharing economy is fueled by technological innovations,
 33. See, e.g., Zale, supra note 3, at 512–13 (providing an analytical framework and 
taxonomy for home-sharing, ride-sharing and other sharing economy activities);); see also
Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 147, 172–75 (2016) (analyzing local government regulations of the sharing
economy); Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government 
Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 942– 
63 (2015) (discussing how local government responses to the sharing economy may evolve 
from top-down regulatory approaches); Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: 
Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 16, 27–28 (2015) (discussing potential regulatory treatment of meal-sharing 
activities).
34. See, e.g., SHAREABLE, http://www.shareable.net/about [https://perma.cc/CL67­
J7S6] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (describing the sharing economy as a “transformation”
that is “democratizing how we produce, consume, govern, and solve social problems”);
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which can certainly raise unique legal questions, but the sharing economy 
is not sui generis.35  While new conceptual frameworks may be necessary 
to analyze and respond to some aspects of the sharing economy, this 
Article demonstrates how existing frameworks can be drawn on to inform 
both our understanding of the regulatory challenge of scale in the sharing 
economy and the development of governance in response. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I analyzes the governance of 
small-scale activities.  Drawing on literature from a range of legal fields, 
this Part considers why regulatory systems typically treat small-scale
activities with reduced stringency, as well as how and why the governance
response shifts when small-scale activities occur in large numbers.  Part
II turns to the implications of small-scale activities in the sharing economy.
It begins with an overview of the sharing economy and the role of platforms 
as network orchestrators. It then explores the full implications of scale in
the sharing economy, by unpacking how scale in the sharing economy
produces negative cumulative impacts and regulatory fractures that threaten 
to undermine civil rights and other laws, and argues that justifications for 
regulatory leniency do not apply with full force to home-sharing and ride-
hailing. Part III proposes several governance mechanisms that respond to 
the negative consequences of scale in the sharing economy, such as co-
regulation, scaled regulation, and cooperative regulation.  A brief conclusion 
follows. 
David Streitfeld, Companies Built on Sharing Balk When It Comes to Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/companies-built­
on-sharing-balk-when-it-comes-to-regulators.html (quoting Airbnb’s CEO’s comments to 
supporters that “[t]here are laws for people and there are laws for business, but you are a 
new category, a third category, people as businesses  . . . . . As hosts, you are 
microentrepreneurs, and there are no laws written for microentrepreneurs.”).
35. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 506 (1999) (“[W]hile particular versions of cyberspace do resist 
effective regulation, it does not follow that every version of cyberspace does so as well. 
Or alternatively, there are versions of cyberspace where behavior can be regulated, and the 
government can take steps to increase this regulability.”). 
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I. REGULATION AND SCALE
The literature on governance and regulation—why we regulate,36 how 
to regulate,37 and the effects of regulation38—is immense, and it is beyond 
the scope of this Article to summarize the many important insights scholars 
have contributed to this field.  Instead, my focus here is to draw on this
literature to answer two questions central to this Article’s inquiry into the 
regulatory challenge of scale in the sharing economy.
First, why do regulatory systems typically treat small-scale activities 
with reduced stringency? I identify five factors justifying regulatory
leniency for small-scale activities: (1) the de minimis character of the activities;
(2) privacy and autonomy concerns; (3) enforcement costs; (4) fairness 
concerns; and (5) alternatives to legal regulation. Second, how and why
does the governance response to small-scale activities shift when the activities 
occur in large numbers?  I explore how this shift in scale distinguishes private 
law from public law in a range of legal contexts and unpack how cumulative
impacts of small-scale activities shape regulatory responses. 
36. We can broadly understand regulation as a response to externalities. See Lisa
Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 136, 
140–41 (2014) (“[T]he existence of externalities is one of the most commonly proffered,
and most widely accepted, arguments for government intervention in markets and
individual liberty.”).  Externalities are the external effects of an activity on third parties. 
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation, & Reregulation: The 
Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 94 (1996) (citing Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice 
Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 17 
(1989)) (defining externalities)); see also N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
196, 199 (7th ed. 2014) (defining negative externalities as when the external effects of an 
activity impose costs on third parties and positive externalities are when the external effects of
an activity yield benefits to third parties).
37. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation 
Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69, 73 (2015) (discussing 
the challenge regulators face in determining appropriate tax regulations and that: “[t]he
government’s job—crafting rules that encourage compliance, discourage avoidance, and do
not impose a heavy compliance burden on taxpayers—is an extremely difficult one.”).
38. See generally Luke A. Stewart, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the 
United States: A Cross-Industry Literature Review, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 
(June 2010), http://www.itif.org/files/2011-impact-regulation-innovation.pdf (summarizing
literature from a range of disciplines on the impact of regulation on innovation). 
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A. Regulatory Leniency for Small-Scale Activities 
Across a range of legal contexts, small-scale activities are either exempt
from or subject to lowered levels of regulatory oversight.  From small 
businesses exemptions in health and safety laws39 to intellectual property 
law’s “homestyle” exemption for broadcasts of copyrighted material,40 
regulatory systems routinely treat small-scale activities with reduced 
stringency.41 This Section examines why this is the case.  I identify five
factors justifying regulatory leniency: (1) the de minimis character of the
activity; (2) privacy and autonomy concerns; (3) enforcement costs; (4) 
fairness concerns; and (5) alternatives to legal regulation. 
1. De Minimis Character of Small-Scale Activities 
Small-scale activities are, by their very definition, small.  This means 
that each small-scale occurrence of a small-scale activity contributes a minimal
amount to the overall amount of that activity, and correspondingly, a minimal 
amount to any social “bads” caused by that activity.  For example, an
individual driving a vehicle to work in a city is just one of many thousands— 
or hundreds of thousands or millions—of people engaged in that activity 
everyday.  While there are recognized social “bads” caused by solo
commuting—from traffic congestion to increased emissions—each individual 
driver’s contribution to overall levels of those problems is minimal. 
Because individual actors contribute relatively so little to the problem 
that regulation seeks to address, the regulation of small-scale actors raises
what Professors Stack and Vandenbergh have termed the “one percent” 
problem.42  Arguments that such de minimis actors should be exempt from
regulation have intuitive appeal.43  Not only do cognitive biases make it 
difficult for individuals to “evaluat[e] and mak[e] use of very low-value 
probabilities,” but individuals also “have a tendency to treat very small
percentages and probabilities as if they were zero.”44  Thus, arguments 
like that of economist E.F. Schumacher, who believed that “[s]mall-scale 
39. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 17, at 1068–69. 
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012)(5)  (providing that broadcasts of copyrighted 
material on “a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes” are 
not liable for infringement, unless there is a charge or it is re-transmitted to the public).
41. “Regulatory systems,” as the term is used here, refers to public law, as opposed 
to private law. See infra Section I.B (discussing the distinctions between public and
private law).  Small-scale activities often remain subject to private law, even where they
are not subject to public law. 
42. Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2011). 
43. Id.
 44. Id. at 1388, 1398. 
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operations no matter how numerous are always less likely to be harmful to
the natural environment than large-scale ones, simply because their individual 
force is small in relation to the recuperative forces of nature,” can persuade
us that regulation is unnecessary.45 
An exception to the de minimis justification for regulatory leniency is 
where de minimis activity poses a risk of serious harm.46  Even if the
likelihood of harm occurring is low, when small-scale activity poses a risk
of serious harm, it is more likely to be regulated.  For example, in many
states, it is illegal not only to buy or sell unpasteurized milk, but also to
“deliver, give away, or knowingly receive” unpasteurized milk, because 
of the serious health risks that are posed by bacteria in unpasteurized 
products.47 
2. Privacy and Autonomy Concerns 
Concerns about intrusions into autonomy, privacy, and intimacy can limit 
the reach of regulation.  Determining when exactly such concerns are raised 
can be challenging; as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[b]etween
the[] poles” of activities that warrant government oversight and those that
do not, “lies a broad range of human relationships that may make greater 
or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions by 
the State.”48 
Courts have identified some factors that may be determinative in deciding 
where to draw the line between conduct that warrants government oversight 
and that which does not.49  One such factor is the commercial or personal 
nature of an activity.  While precise definitions vary, commercial activity 
typically involves monetary gain—direct or indirect—from an activity; a 
45. Schumacher, supra note 22, at 36. 
46. I focus here on the seriousness of the harm with respect to an individual incident 
of small-scale activity. The discussion in Section I.B infra of the cumulative impacts also 
deals with the seriousness of harm of an activity, but as a cumulative matter.
47. See JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 433–34 (2012)
(emphasis omitted).
48. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984) (citing competing 
considerations such as personal and familial autonomy).  Relationships that implicate 
freedom of association concerns “are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, 
a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the relationship.” Id. at 620. 
49. See Zale, supra note 3, at 522–24 (providing the examples of the commercial/ 
non-commercial dichotomy in a range of legal contexts).
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non-commercial or personal activity does not.50  Another factor in determining
whether autonomy concerns necessitate regulatory leniency is where the 
activity takes place.  Activities taking place in private, personal spaces— 
particularly homes—have traditionally benefitted from a hands-off regulatory
approach.51  Additionally, when regulation targets an activity where “unrestricted
individual choice has been (or is perceived to have been) the norm,”  autonomy 
concerns may weigh against regulating.52 
Thus, when small-scale activities fall on the non-commercial end of the
spectrum, occur in private spaces like the home, or implicate norms of
individual choice, they are more likely to be treated with a light regulatory
touch. For example, one friend inviting another friend over to dinner at 
their home would normally be considered a personal or non-commercial 
activity.  Although home dining involves many of the same underlying
activities as dinner in a restaurant—the preparation of food and use of 
cooking appliances—it is exempt from a range of regulations applicable 
to restaurants, from food safety inspections to building code requirements 
for commercial kitchens to employment laws for staff. The lenient regulatory 
environment is not because there is no danger of food poisoning or faulty
stoves in a home-dining scenario. Rather, the lack of direct regulation of 
home cooks is largely due to the fact that it is a non-commercial activity 
occurring in the private space of the home, thereby entitling it to regulatory 
deference for reasons of personal autonomy and privacy.53 
Even when small-scale activity is commercial, it still may receive regulatory
deference if it occurs in a personal space, such as the home.54 For example, 
50. See CREATIVE COMMONS, DEFINING “NONCOMMERCIAL”: A STUDY OF HOW THE
ONLINE POPULATION UNDERSTANDS “NONCOMMERCIAL USE” 11 (Sept. 2009), http://mirrors.
creativecommons.org/defining-noncommercial/Defining_Noncommercial_fullreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y9ZJ-7M8Y]. 
51. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual
Behaviors that Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1168–74 (2012) (discussing
the “significance of home” in substantive due process cases). 
52. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 
IDAHO L. REV. 325, 346 (2002); see also David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism 
when Numbers Matter More than Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 265–66 (2014) 
(“The historical record highlights both the long-standing prominence of small sources and 
the persistent challenges (political and otherwise) of regulating them . . . .  [T]he interests
of small businesses and the public may be diffuse, but in absolute terms they are not necessarily
small—the pubic cares a great deal, for example, about having the freedom to use their 
cars . . . .”).
53. Other reasons for non-regulation of the home-dining scenario are enforcement
costs, see infra notes 62–73 and accompanying text, and the availability of alternatives to 
formal regulation, such as informal norms, see infra notes 80–89 and accompanying text; 
See generally Schindler, supra note 33 (discussing regulatory treatment of informal dining 
arrangements). 
54. Conversely, there are situations where even non-commercial activities that occur in
personal spaces are regulated, because privacy and autonomy concerns are outweighed by
962
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under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), landlord-owners whose properties 
contain four units or less and who occupy the property as their residence
are exempt from FHA prohibitions against discrimination against protected
classes in the sale or rental of those properties.55  Even though such individuals
are engaged in commercial activity, the “Mrs. Murphy” exemption reflects
Congress’s determination that significant autonomy concerns are also
raised when a property owner lives in close proximity with others.56  The
result is that small-scale owners and landlords whose property contains
less than five units can discriminate against protected classes in the sale
or rental of housing.57 
However, regulatory deference for reasons of privacy and autonomy is 
not static. Shifts in social beliefs or new scientific information about a
particular activity may lead to a greater or lesser acceptance of regulatory 
intrusions into privacy or autonomy.  In some cases such shifts in societal 
beliefs or new information may lead to greater acceptance of regulations
that put some burden on personal autonomy, as with seat belt laws.58  In
other cases, it may lead to lesser acceptance of regulatory burdens on 
autonomy, as with birth control and sodomy laws.59 
competing considerations, such as the seriousness of harm posed by the activity.  See 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (upholding an Ohio state law criminalizing the 
viewing or possession of child pornography in the home). 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2012).  However, the exemption does not apply to 
discriminatory advertisements, which are prohibited by all owners, including “Mrs. Murphy” 
types. Id. 
56. In addition, there likely were political motivations for the exemption.  See James 
D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption 
to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 607–09 (1999) (“Circumstantial 
evidence also points to the influence of racial politics in the inclusion of the Mrs. Murphy
exemption in the FHA.”).
57. The Mrs. Murphy exemption has been criticized.  See David M. Forman, A 
Room for “Adam and Steve” at Mrs. Murphy’s Bed and Breakfast: Avoiding the Sin of
Inhospitality in Places of Public Accommodation, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 328
(2012) (criticizing the Mrs. Murphy exception in the context of sexual orientation
discrimination); Walsh, supra note 56, at 606 (“[T]he exemption indicates where society,
speaking through Congress, draws the line in the clash between civil rights and civil 
liberties.  This Note will argue that Congress drew the line in the wrong place, rendering
the exemption over-inclusive as a protector of liberty.”).
58. See, e.g., People v. Kohrig, 498 N.E.2d 1158, 1161 (Ill. 1986) (holding that 
while a state seat belt law “implicates a person’s interest in ‘liberty’” by restricting freedom of
choice, it does not implicate the intimate and private aspects of one’s life and thus only
requires a rational basis justification).
59. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a state anti-
sodomy law which “further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion 
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Furthermore, while privacy and autonomy concerns may limit the direct 
regulation of certain types of small-scale activities, regulation often indirectly 
targets those activities. For example, if the government were to dictate 
how many miles people could drive each day in an effort to reduce carbon 
emissions, this would likely be extremely unpopular.60  However, when 
the government sets fuel efficiency standards, and other emissions criteria 
for car manufacturers, which can then only sell vehicles that meet those
standards, the desired outcome—reduced carbon emissions—can be at least 
partially achieved with less resistance to the regulation on privacy and 
autonomy grounds.61 
3. Enforcement Costs 
In determining whether to regulate any activity, efficiency is a major 
concern.62 According to standard welfare economics principles, “society 
should enact all regulations that provide a net social benefit—and only
such regulations.”63  There is a size at which government oversight is “worth
it,” and efficiency considerations are often the method used to determine 
what point that is.64 Under an efficiency analysis, if the cost of enforcing 
regulations against an actor would exceed the benefits, then not regulating
is an efficient response.65 
into the personal and private life of the individual”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (striking down a state law forbidding the provision of birth control as 
conflicting with individual’s right to privacy).
60. See Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 
17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 148–49 (1998) (describing the failure of the Employee Trip
Reduction requirement provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990). 
61. See id. at 148. 
62. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE  ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS xvi (1988) (noting that the wave of deregulation across industries in the 
1970s was in part due to the shared perception that “regulation had . . . sheltered inefficiency . . .”).
63. Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 
J. CORP. L. 347, 350 & n.15 (2013).  Scholars debate what exactly should be factored into 
the welfare calculus. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Penalver, Properties 
of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 134 (2009) (setting out a human-
flourishing approach to property law that “rests upon a thicker conception of the good 
human life than is embraced” by traditional welfare economics approaches).
64. See Emily Badger, Why We Can’t Figure Out How to Regulate Airbnb, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2014/04/23/why-we-cant-figure-out-how-to-regulate-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/GHT8-VDQG]
(“We’re always making a tradeoff between the burden of regulation, and the safety—or
public benefit—created by it.”).
65. C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business 
Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 25 (2004) (“If the total 
cost of applying a regulation to small firms or small transactions exceeds the total benefit, 
those firms or transactions should be exempted from the regulation in the absence of any
transaction costs associated with the exemption.  Thus, absent transaction costs, size­
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Enforcement costs are of particular concern when considering regulation 
of small-scale actors because the costs of enforcing regulation may be
significant and the benefits relatively minor.66  Agencies tasked with 
enforcement of regulations often rationally devote their limited resources 
to the most cost-effective enforcement activity.67  Often, this means 
enforcement agencies focus on large actors that are statistically more
likely to have violations than smaller ones, simply because of the larger
volume of relevant activity.68  Thus, small business exemptions—or lowered 
regulatory standards—are justified for efficiency reasons in a range of regulatory
contexts, from health care law to employment law to intellectual property
law.69 
based exemptions can be efficient. [However,] exemptions do have transaction costs, and
those transaction costs complicate the analysis, making it less likely that any particular
small business exemption is efficient.” (emphasis omitted)).
66. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-669, CLEAN AIR ACT:
EPA SHOULD IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS AIR TOXICS PROGRAM 23 (June 2006),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/250607.pdf  [https://perma.cc/34K2-6RRY] (“Challenges 
in regulating small stationary sources center on difficulty in characterizing the large
number of widely dispersed facilities . . . .  In some cases, data do not exist on the number
or location of facilities potentially subject to a regulation.  Furthermore, unlike the large
stationary sources . . . owners and operators of these [small] sources have limited resources to
implement regulations and will require extensive outreach and compliance assistance.”).
67. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special
Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 561 (1998). 
68. See id. (“No regulatory agency has investigative and enforcement resources
sufficient to ensure anything approaching comprehensive compliance with its rules.  OSHA, 
for instance, can inspect less than one percent of the worksites for which it has regulatory
responsibility in a given year.  Agencies allocate their scarce compliance and enforcement 
resources disproportionately to large firms.”).  In addition, enforcement agencies may focus on
large actors because of the limited penalties that may be permitted under particular
administrative schemes against smaller actors. Id. at 561–62; see also Shu-Yi Oei & Diane 
M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1054 (2016) (“[I]t may not 
be worth IRS’ effort to audit multiple, low dollar amount, individual returns of these
microbusiness earners in order to determine compliance.  Thus, traditional audit strategies 
may not be cost effective.”).
69. See Pierce, supra note 67, at 542 nn.23–27 (describing regulatory fields with small
business exemptions); see also Eyal-Cohen, supra note 17, at 1044 (discussing various 
regulatory regimes for which categorization as “small business” matters).  A federal 
agency—the Small Business Administration—as well as analogous state agencies have 
been created to promote the growth of small businesses, including reducing regulatory
burdens imposed on them.  See, e.g., Office of the Small Business Advocate, CAL. GOVERNOR’S 
OFFICE OF BUS. & ECON. DEV., http://www.business.ca.gov-gobiz-elb-1780917013.us­
west-2.elb.amazonaws.com/Programs/SmallBusiness.aspxSmall-Business-Assistance/
Office-of-Small-Business-Advocate [https://perma.cc/FZY9-K5CG] (last visited Nov. 2,
2016) (describing California’s small business agency).
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However, a number of researchers have criticized exemptions for small
businesses for failing to accurately calculate the true costs of regulating— 
or failing to regulate—small-scale actors.70  For example, one study found
that employees at small firms are 500 times more likely to experience a 
fatal accident than employees at larger firms, raising questions about the
exemptions from workplace safety laws for small firms.71  Another study 
found that smaller firms appear to engage in illicit behavior with respect 
to backdating stock options more often than larger firms.72  Thus, although
the costs of enforcing regulation against small-scale actors may be relatively 
high compared to costs of enforcing regulations against larger entities, if 
small-scale actors make up the bulk of the regulated “bad,” the cost-benefit 
analysis may need to be recalibrated.73 
4. Fairness Concerns
In addition to efficiency concerns, many—though not all—governance 
scholars believe that regulations should also promote other social goals, 
such as fairness, justice, and equity.74  Fairness is an elusive concept, 
which involves subjective judgment,75 but it may be broadly framed as 
encompassing the moral considerations regarding distributive justice
 70. See, e.g., Eyal-Cohen, supra note 17, at 1045–46 (“[E]conomic stimulus, job
creation, and the promotion of entrepreneurship will not be accomplished by focusing 
merely on size, but by crafting purposive definitions that will target and reward entities
according to the activities the government seeks to encourage.”); Pierce, supra note 67, at 
539, 542–43 (contending that “special regulatory treatment of small firms is both unjustified
and socially destructive”).
71. Pierce, supra note 67, at 558. 
72. Deniz Anginer et al., Should Size Matter When Regulating Firms?  Implications
from Backdating of Executive Options, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2012). 
73. See Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 42, at 1396 (“The threshold requirement 
for regulation—whether in securities, environmental regulation, or lobbying—stands as a 
very rough proxy for the point at which the costs of compliance are likely to exceed the 
benefits. What drives these exemptions is the relative cost of compliance and the relatively 
small scope of the activities subject to the exemptions.  But this cost-benefit calculation 
should shift depending on the proportion of activities that fall within the exemptions.”). 
74. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 966–68 (2001) (arguing that “legal policies should depend exclusively
on their effects on individuals’ welfare.  In particular, in the evaluation of legal policies, 
no independent weight should be accorded to conceptions of fairness, such as corrective
justice and desert in punishment.”). 
75. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 979, 1000 (2003) (discussing a conception of fairness as being drawn from the notion 
that “the foundation of moral thought lies in an ‘impersonal standpoint’ from which each
of us must recognize that, objectively speaking, we are no more important than anyone 
else” (citing THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 10–11 (1991))). 
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concerns.76  Thus, even though a particular governance response may be
efficient from a welfare-maximizing perspective, if regulation produces 
unfair results then it may not be justified, at least according to those who
believe the role of regulation is to produce fair outcomes in addition to
efficient ones.77 
Fairness concerns may militate against regulating small-scale actors 
because doing so would require them to bear a burden disproportionately 
greater than the harm they are causing.  For example, exemptions or lowered 
regulatory compliance are often justified for small businesses because
uniformly imposing the same regulation on firms of all sizes imposes
proportionally higher costs on small businesses, which do not benefit from
the economies of scale that large firms do.78  The resulting competitive
advantage to larger firms may drive small-scale firms out of the market;
while this outcome may be economically efficient, it may be perceived as 
unfair.79 
5. Alternatives to Legal Regulation
Law is not the only mechanism that can be used to affect or shape 
human behavior.  As Lawrence Lessig has discussed in his scholarship, 
76. See, e.g., Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 629 (2005) (“In [the Rawlsian view of contract law], fairness 
is not defined in terms of the will of consenting parties, but rather by an external standard
of distributive justice.”).
77. See Fallon, supra note 75, at 1003 (criticizing Kaplow’s and Shavell’s rejection 
of fairness); see also The Sharing Economy, VA. MUN. LEAGUE 16 (July 2015), http:// 
www.vml.org/sites/default/files/15SharingEconomyGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBF5­
NRQF] (discussing the role of regulation in ensuring equal access to services: “While the 
marketplace has an appropriate and necessary role in determining where and how services
are delivered, it is incumbent upon local government officials to monitor these services to 
ensure that they are provided in an equitable, non-discriminatory manner and that the
benefits represented by the sharing economy are readily accessible to all.”). 
78. See Bradford, supra note 65, at 29 (“Uniform application of regulatory
requirements, without small business exemptions, gives a competitive advantage to larger 
firms, which have a lower per-unit compliance cost due to economies of scale.”))). 
79. The outcome may also raise efficiency concerns because “the increased costs 
to small firms resulting from economies of scale will raise barriers to entry and eliminate 
the potential competition on which we rely so heavily to keep prices in line.” Id. at 29 
(first citing Russell W. Pittman, Issues in Pollution Control: Interplant Cost Differences and 
Economies of Scale, 57 LAND ECON. 1, 13 (1981); then Robert A. Leone, The Real Costs
of Regulation, HARV. BUS. REV. 57, 62 (1977); and then Impact of Federal Regulation on 
Small Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Bus. Problems of the H. 
Comm. on Small Bus., 96th Cong 125 (1979) (statement of Dr. Milton Kafoglis)). 
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non-legal tools—such as norms, markets, and architecture—an also constrain 
behavior.80  In some cases, these alternatives to legal regulation may be
equally or more effective than legal regulations alone in producing desired
social outcomes.81  In such cases, we may expect to see less direct formal 
legal regulation of individuals and more reliance on alternatives to regulation.82 
When small-scale activities involve areas where individual choice is 
strongly embedded, shaping that activity through changes in norms—whether 
directly or indirectly—may be particularly effective in changing behavior.83 
Societies often enforce norms through social sanctions in the form of
reputational costs.84  Because small-scale activities often involve individual
actors for whom personal reputation is crucial to continue to engage in the
activity, informal norms may be effective in influencing their behavior, 
thereby reducing the need for formal regulation.85
 80. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 661– 
63 (1998) (identifying these constraints on behavior outside the law and suggesting rather 
than being justifications for the state doing less, the existence of these alternative structures
can act “as additional tools for a more effective activism” by the state).
81. Whether alternatives to regulation, such as informal norms, produce the same
constraints on socially undesirable behavior as formal regulation is a matter of debate.
See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (2001)
(“[S]ocial norms play a much less significant role in encouraging behavior necessary to
resolve a large-number, small-payoff collective action problem than social norms enthusiasts
might believe.”); Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 350–51 (1997) (discussing the effectiveness of norms in the deterrence of 
criminal behavior). 
82. These non-legal alternatives to regulation themselves are often shaped by the 
law. See Lessig, supra note 80, at 662 (“[R]ather than diminishing the role of law, these 
alternatives suggest a wider range of regulatory means for any particular state 
regulation. . . . [L]aw not only regulates behavior directly, but law also regulates behavior 
indirectly, by regulating these other modalities of regulation directly.” (emphasis omitted)); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 913 (1996)
(“A good deal of governmental action is self-consciously designed to change norms, meanings, 
or roles, and in that way to increase the individual benefits or decrease the individual costs
associated with certain acts.”).
83. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence 
Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1262 (2000) 
(describing the failure of San Diego’s attempt to change commuter behavior and ease congestion 
through HOV-only lanes: “[T]he norm of solo commuting was not undermined. People
were willing to drive solo even if it meant longer commutes.”).
84. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 915; see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997) (articulating 
an “esteem theory” of norms in which “the desire for esteem creates a norm . . . . [And]
norm violators [are punished] by withholding from them the esteem they seek”). 
85. To emphasize Lessig’s point, however, regulation may still indirectly affect
behavior, by being applied to the particular norm at issue. See sources cited supra note 
82. 
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Consider childcare services.  Day-care centers are subject to formal
regulations, such as minimum wage, child labor laws, or child-care licensing.86 
These same regulations rarely apply to teenage babysitters, even though 
teenage babysitters perform essentially the same functional tasks as child
day-care centers.87  Instead, informal norms accomplish many of the same
goals that formal legal regulation might otherwise.  Parents usually know 
the babysitter’s own parents, who not only provide the personal references 
needed to entrust a child to a teenager and serve as a backstop able to 
intervene in the case of emergency, but who also act as a strong non-legal
constraint on the teenager’s behavior.
However, there are limits to the effectiveness of norms and other non­
legal mechanisms in shaping small-scale activities.  Norms have been
shown to be effective when small-scale actors are relatively homogenous 
and have repeated interactions with each other, but are less effective
inheterogeneous groups of small-scale actors who do not engage in repeated
actions.88  Additionally, as the number of small-scale actors grows, the 
effectiveness of norms tends to decrease.89  The next Section explores in
more detail how increases in small-scale activity affect governance. 
B. The Large-Scale Occurrence of Small-Scale Activities 
While regulatory systems often treat small-scale activities with reduced
stringency for the reasons discussed above, as the amount of small-scale 
activity increases, there is often a shift in the governance response to the
activity.  This Section begins by exploring how this shift in scale distinguishes 
private law from public law in a range of legal contexts.  It then discusses 
the concept of cumulative impacts and analyzes how the aggregate effects
of small-scale activities can necessitate a regulatory response. 
86. See, e.g., California Child Day Care Facilities Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 1596.70–1596.7995 (West 2008) (establishing a range of regulatory requirements that
apply to childcare facilities in the state).
87. Some forms of formal legal regulation are still applicable to teenage babysitters;
tort and criminal law, for example, apply.  However, these are largely ex post legal regulations;
the type of ex ante legal regulations applied to day-care facilities discussed above are largely
inapplicable.
88. See Carlson, supra note 81, at 1245–47. 
89. See id.
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1. Public Law vs. Private Law 
Scale is a seemingly straightforward concept: it signals an increase or 
decrease in size or number.90  As a legal construct, at the most macro-
level, scale distinguishes public law from private law.  Traditionally, public 
and private law are defined by subject matter. Private law is concerned with
rights and duties individuals and entities owe to each other, and it encompasses 
subjects such as torts, contracts, family law, and property law.91  Public
law is concerned with the government’s relationship to private parties and
includes constitutional law, criminal law, and a range of administrative 
and regulatory laws.92 
However, the line between private and public law is less a question of 
subject matter and more a question of scale. For example, the relationship 
between an individual landlord and tenant would appear to fall squarely 
in the realm of private contract and property law.  Yet, in today’s society
where there are a large number of individual landlord-tenant relationships, 
the law of landlord-tenant relationships has evolved to be largely a matter 
of public law, ranging from rent control ordinances to administrative law
on eviction to statutory requirements for repairs.93 
This same pattern—a subject traditionally considered an area of private
law evolving into a matter of public law when the small-scale activity
between individuals occurs in large-scale numbers—is evident across a
range of legal contexts.  Employment law, for example, involves private 
contractual arrangements, but the employer-employee relationship has 
become the subject of significant regulatory oversight at the federal, state,
and local levels, with respect to everything from minimum wage laws to 
90. Scale, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/
american/scale_1 [https://perma.cc/7BCU-7MNT] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (defining 
scale as “the size of something”). 
91. See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
1109, 1116–17 (2012) (defining public and private law); see also Joanna Kudisch Weinberg,
The Judicial Adjunct and Public Law Remedies, 1 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 367 n.1 (1983) 
(defining public law litigation as “all complex litigation where a broadly characterized
public interest, that is one which extends beyond the particular interests of the parties, is 
at stake”).
92. Weinberg, supra note 91, at 367 n.1; see also John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: 
Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012) (“Like many legal
concepts, ‘private law’ has recognizable referents yet eludes precise definition.  Private 
law defines the rights and duties of individuals and private entities as they relate to one 
another.”). 
93. See JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY 455–93 (4th ed. 2014) (describing various public 
laws regulating the landlord–tenant relationship, such as security deposit requirements, anti-
eviction protections, rent control, housing codes, and lead paint laws). 
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anti-discrimination laws to family leave laws.94  Similarly, the scale of 
residential foreclosures in 2008 tipped the legal response from a private 
contract law issue between individual mortgagor and mortgagee to one of 
public consumer protection law, in which federal and state governments 
injected statutory reforms such as tax relief for borrowers95 and requirements
for mandatory mediation before foreclosure.96  A similar evolution occurred 
with regard to land use law, where private law of nuisance and servitudes 
has been supplemented by the public law of zoning and land use law,
developed over the course of the last century as individual interactions 
between neighbors occurred in greater numbers as society grew more
urbanized.97 
Thus, whenever we see a particular type of small-scale activity occurring 
in greater numbers, we tend to also see a shift from the realm of private 
law and regulatory leniency to public law and regulatory oversight.  The 
next Section considers why this shift occurs. 
2. Cumulative Impacts and Scale
When small-scale activities occur in large numbers, there is, in a quantitative 
sense, more of that activity.  More activity means more impacts from that 
activity.  These aggregate impacts are known as cumulative impacts.
Cumulative impacts occur when individual activities, which may cause only
de minimis– or no– negative impacts, result in aggregate harms when
repeated by numerous individual actors.98
 94. Marna M. Tess-Mattner, Employer-Employee Issues: Eight Danger Areas, 21 
GPSOLO MAG. (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_
home/gp_solo_magazine_index/employeremployeeissues.html. [https://perma.cc/VSC5­
S4X3].
95. For example, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 allowed taxpayers
to exclude income from the discharge of debt on their principal residence, up to a certain 
amount.  Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–142, § 2, 121
Stat. 1803, 1803–04 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 108 (2012)). 
96. See, e.g., Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1284 (Nev. 2011)
(describing Nevada’s mandatory mediation law); see also Robin Paul Malloy & James Charles 
Smith, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 406–09 (4th ed. 2013) (describing other statutory
reforms in response to the 2008 financial crisis). 
97. See SINGER, supra note 93, at 635 (describing the limits of nuisance and servitude 
law and the development of zoning and other public land use regulations to accomplish 
land use goals).
98. See Kellen Zale, The ‘Government’s Right to Destroy, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269,
272 (2015) (discussing cumulative impacts in the context of property demolitions); see 
also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2015) (defining cumulative impact under NEPA and noting that 
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The problem of negative cumulative impacts is evident across a range
of legal contexts, from corporate law to civil rights law to employment 
law.99  Economist Alfred Kahn recognized how the aggregate result of a
series of individually rational “small decisions” can result in a cumulative 
impact of market failure.100 Kahn contended that because of the “limited 
size, scope and time-perspective” of individual decisions, the result of many
such individual decisions may be outcomes that do not reflect individuals’ 
desired outcome “if they were ever given the opportunity explicitly to vote 
for or against it.”101 
Drawing on Kahn’s insights, biologist William Odum explored cumulative
impacts in the context of environmental science.102  Odum was one of the
first scholars in the environmental movement to recognize how the 
accumulation of small-scale decisions can result in environmental outcomes
that would not be the “optimal, desired, or preferred solution for society.”103 
For example, the destruction of coastal wetlands may result from a series
of individually rational development decisions by coastal property owners,104 
but it is unlikely that individuals would choose to destroy a coastal
wetlands—and experience both the ecological and market costs that result— 
if they had a chance to collectively make the “big decision” at the outset.105 
Because individuals typically do not have that collective opportunity, Odum,
it can “result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over
a period of time”).  Conversely, there are situations where the aggregate results of small-
scale activity produce lower levels of harm than the sum of their individual parts would 
suggest. See Sarah B. Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens and Front Yard Gardens: The
Conflict Between Local Governments and Locavores, 87 TUL. L. REV. 231, 287–92 (2012)
(discussing zoning laws adopted in numerous jurisdictions to allow for small-scale urban
farming).
99. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive 
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 
92–93 (2010) (discussing how the concept of cumulative impacts or cumulative effects 
has influenced legal doctrine in these and other areas).
100. Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections,
and the Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 23, 45 (1966). 
101. Id. As an example of this kind of market failure, Kahn pointed to the
termination of rail service on the Ithaca, New York line, which was bemoaned almost 
universally when it was announced, but which was the inevitable result of the loss of
revenues and ridership due to many, many individual decisions to drive instead of use the 
train. Id. at 25–27.  Kahn suggested “extra-market intervention[s],” such as regulations 
authorizing additional public investment in rail service, may be necessary “to offset the
tyranny of small decisions”; otherwise, people will not have “the full range of economically
feasible alternatives required for rational choice.” Id. at 33. 
102. William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 
32 BIOSCIENCE 728, 728 (1982). 
103. Id. at 728–29. 
104. Id. at 728.
 105. Id. 
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like Kahn, suggested corrective governance measures might be needed, 
such as strengthening of environmental regulation to take a more holistic 
view of large-scale problems caused by small-scale activities.106 
To address cumulative impacts, regulators may also need to modify the
initial rules applying to individual, small-scale actions to account for the 
negative aggregate effects. Environmental and land use law is an area where
negative cumulative impacts are of particular concern.  Massive problems
such as climate change,107 water pollution,108 and sprawl109 have been
recognized as being caused not primarily by any single actor, but rather as
the result of incremental, small-scale actions of millions of people.110 
Although each individual action may be de minimis—a “one percent”
actor, as Vandenbergh and Ruhl refer to it—the aggregate effects of their
 106. Id. at 729.  While suggesting these corrective measures, Odom himself was not 
optimistic about the chances of success, noting that federal regulators tend to “become
entangled in their own bureaucratic red tape” and that lower levels of government are 
structurally ill-suited to “solving complex problems of environmental management.” Id. 
A number of environmental laws, such as the National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA) and state laws such as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), have
been enacted that explicitly require consideration of cumulative impacts. See, e.g., CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 21083 (West 2016) (“[A] project may have a ‘significant effect on the 
environment’ if . . . [t]he possible effects of a project are individually limited but cumulatively
considerable.”); COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS UNDER 
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1 (1997), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/
nepa_documents/RedDont/G-CEQ-ConsidCumulEffects.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LLD-M59G].
107. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 99, at 92–93 (discussing challenge of
regulating the cumulative impacts of small-scale actors in the context of climate change).
108. See, e.g., Mackenzie Kasti & Joan Rose, Septic Tanks Aren’t Keeping Poo Out 
of Rivers and Lakes, MICH. ST. U. TODAY, (Aug. 3, 2015), http://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2015/
septic-tanks-arent-keeping-poo-out-of-rivers-and-lakes/ [https://perma.cc/UY86-Q3KN]
(“For years we have been seeing the effects of fecal pollution, but we haven’t known where 
it is coming from. . . . Pollution sources scattered in an area—called non-point—have 
historically been a significant challenge in managing water quality.”). 
109. See, e.g., Zale, The Government’s Right to Destroy, supra note 98, at 301–02
(citing REID EWING ET AL., SMART GROWTH AMERICA, MEASURING SPRAWL AND ITS IMPACT
17–21 (2002), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/MeasuringSprawl.PDF)
[https://perma.cc/R7TX-FTN8]) (“The cumulative effect of the numerous individual actions in
the case of sprawl produces a myriad of negative effects, such as increased infrastructure 
cost, ecosystem degradation and fragmentation, and socio-economic inequality.”).
110. On the general problem of aggregate impacts of small-scale actors, see Ruhl
& Salzman, supra note 99, at 65. The problem of the aggregate impacts of small-scale
environmental harms has been explored by a number of environmental law scholars. See,
e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 
161 (2011); Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2012); Vandenbergh, supra note 20, at 534; Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235, 237 (2014).
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activity can make it impossible to achieve a particular social good unless 
the individually de minimis activity is regulated.111 When “small contributors
account for so much of a regulatory problem that the social goal cannot be 
met without regulating many one percent sources,” then exempting small-
scale actors from regulation because of their de minimis contributions harms 
the very social benefits or public goods that the regulation was intended 
to protect.112 
While recalibrating federal environmental laws to account for the 
cumulative impacts of small-scale actors has proven challenging,113 local
environmental and land use laws frequently regulate small-scale activities 
to account for negative cumulative impacts.  For example, numerous cities 
have hillside building ordinances or impermeable surface regulations that 
impose restrictions on individual property owners who seek to build on 
hillsides or increase the paved surface on their properties.114  While one
more house on a hill, or one more parking lot may have a de minimis effect
when considered as an isolated action, the aggregate effect of the activity
repeated over and over can have significant negative impacts on erosion 
and storm water runoff that threaten the health and safety of the entire
community.115 
While non-legal constraints such as markets and norms can address
some types of negative cumulative impacts, those mechanisms are not 
always as effective as formal legal regulation.  As Kahn and Odum recognized, 
111. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 99, at 92; see also Stack & Vandenbergh, supra
note 42, at 1388. 
112. Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 42, at 1388, 1397 (“No one stands for treating 
trifles as anything but.  The key is to see that defining something as a trifle depends on an
assessment of the surrounding landscape.”); see also Pierce, supra note 67, at 557 (“We
impose costly regulatory rules for a reason.  We want to reduce incidences of things we 
consider bad, e.g., occupational injuries, racial discrimination, pollution, or inadequate 
access to healthcare.  Every study of the relationship between firm size and social bads 
produces the same finding—small firms account for a disproportionate quantity of the
social bads that we attempt to reduce through regulation.”).
113. See Vandenbergh, supra note 20, at 518–23 (discussing reasons for federal
environmental law’s focus on large scale actors as opposed to individuals and arguing for
a re-focus on individuals).
114. Zale, supra note 98, at 302 (citing Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Land Made (Too)
Simple, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 10, 167–68 (2003)).
115. In some scenarios, cumulative impacts may cause harms even greater than the 
aggregate sum of their individual parts due to interdependent effects.  For example, certain 
types of water and air pollution may be amplified when they interact with other types of 
conditions (such as other pollutants or natural conditions like weather), resulting in cumulative
impacts “at larger scales than merely the sum of small-scale processes.” See Craig Anthony
(Tony) Arnold, Clean-Water Land Use: Connecting Scale and Function, 23 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 291, 320–21 (2006) (discussing the cumulative impact phenomenon in the context of
water pollution (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW STRATEGIES FOR AMERICA’S 
WATERSHEDS 43 (1999))). 
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markets may fail at responding to the large-scale occurrence of small-scale 
activities.116  Furthermore, there are limits to the effectiveness of norms in
constraining behavior, particularly in cases involving what Professor Ann 
Carlson has termed “large-number, small-payoff collective action problems.”117 
Where a social problem requires behavior changes by large numbers of 
individuals with little economic incentive to do so, norms often fail to take 
hold.118 “Large numbers of people, little economic incentive to act, and 
lack of homogeneity” make it challenging for groups to develop informal 
norms,119 and thus regulation to address the negative cumulative impacts
of such small-scale actors may be more effective.
*****
The analysis above—identifying why regulatory systems tend to treat 
small-scale activities with reduced stringency, and how the cumulative
impacts from the large-scale occurrence of small-scale activities can
necessitate a regulatory response—lays out an underlying framework for
the governance of small-scale activities.  Part II now turns to a fuller 
exploration of the sharing economy and applies the governance framework
to the small-scale activities occurring therein. 
II. SCALE IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
Part I set out a framework for the governance of small-scale activities. 
This Part applies the framework to the sharing economy, focusing on the
two most prominent sectors:: home-sharing and ride-hailing.  I begin with
a brief overview of the sharing economy and an analysis of the role of
platforms as network orchestrators.  I then turn to the implications of scale
in the sharing economy.  While the sharing economy offers great promise 
and opportunity for platforms, participants, and the public, I argue that the
particular configuration of scale in the sharing economy also produces 
negative cumulative impacts and regulatory fractures that threaten to
 116. Kahn, supra note 100, at 25–33; Odum, supra note 102, at 728–29. 
117. Carlson, supra note 81, at 1234–36.  Professor Carlson focuses primarily on the 
example of recycling.
118. Id. at 1235–36.
 119. Id.  Even where norms do become operative, Carlson suggests the impact of 
those norms are not as effective in large-number, small-payoff problems like recycling as 
when those norms apply to small, relatively homogenous groups, or when the norms address 
“large-number, large-payoff problems,” such as AIDS.  Id. at 1236. 
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undermine a range of important public policies, such as affordable housing, 
civil rights, and consumer protection. Furthermore, justifications for regulatory
leniency do not apply with full force to the small-scale activities in the 
sharing economy. 
A. Overview of the Sharing Economy 
In the last half-decade, the sharing economy has emerged as a significant 
economic and social force.120 Companies like Uber and Airbnb have enabled 
millions of people to engage in peer-to-peer and on-demand transactions 
for temporary access to a wide range of goods and services, from apartments 
and cars to meal preparation and transportation.121 Descriptive accounts
of the sharing economy abound in the media,122 and an emerging legal 
scholarship on the subject is also developing.123  Rather than repeat those 
accounts, this Section provides an overview of the sharing economy with
a focus on the role of scale. 
There is no single, agreed-upon definition of what counts as the sharing 
economy; the term “sharing economy” is itself a subject of contention.124 
In my own previous scholarship on the subject, I have focused on four key
characteristics of the sharing economy: (1) monetization of previously un­
monetized assets; (2) access to those assets rather than ownership; (3) 
technologically driven disaggregation of the assets; and (4) peer-to-peer
transactions facilitated by third-party platforms.125  The term “on-demand
economy,” sometimes used interchangeably with the term sharing economy,
relaxes the fourth characteristic and includes both peer-to-peer platforms,
such as Uber, as well as business-to-consumer platforms that use technology 
to disaggregate assets, such as Zipcar and Car2Go.126 The gig economy, 
another term used sometimes interchangeably with the sharing economy,
 120. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
121. Anand Iyer, How Modern Marketplaces Like Uber and Airbnb Build Trust to 
Achieve Liquidity, FIRST ROUND REV., http://firstround.com/review/How-Modern-Market
places-Like-Uber-Airbnb-Build-Trust-to-Hit-Liquidity/ [https://perma.cc/8QUG-ZVEY]
(last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
122. See Zale, Sharing Property, supra note 3, at 503–08 & nn.4–25 and accompanying 
text.
123.  For a sample of the emerging legal scholarship, see supra note 32. 
124. See Zale, supra note 3, at 521–22 (noting that while not all aspects of the sharing
economy involve the monetization of assets—that is, some activities are non-monetized 
or gratuitous sharing, such as community tool libraries—much of the sharing economy
involves commercial exchanges that might be more accurately described as “sharing-for­
a-fee”).
125. Id. at 527 & n.83. 
126. Id. at 525. 
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involves the temporary provision of services, such as the errands-and-more
services offered by Taskrabbit or food delivery services offered by Instacart.127 
While many of the underlying activities occurring in the sharing 
economy, such as home-sharing and ride-hailing, have existed long before 
the emergence of Uber and Airbnb, transaction costs previously limited
such activities to an ad-hoc or informal basis or within close-knit communities. 
For example, until the advent of technology that could easily connect me 
with other people who need accommodation during the specific times my
spare bedroom is available, making arrangements for a short-term rental 
was logistically challenging.  Not only was it difficult to find someone who 
needed accommodation for the precise dates my spare bedroom was available,
but there was also a range of risks, from concerns about safety to the 
failure to pay.  Because of these transaction costs, peer-to-peer home-sharing
and ride-hailing activities were generally limited in numbers, and the pre­
sharing economy was characterized by relatively few larger entities— 
such as hotels and taxi companies—taking advantage of economies of 
scale to provide short-term accommodation and point-to-point transportation. 
Sharing economy companies like Uber and Airbnb, however, have
harnessed technological developments such as GPS location services,
smartphones, and app software to lower transaction costs of what were 
often previously expensive or inconvenient exchanges.  By providing a 
mechanism for connecting people who want access to a good or service 
with those offering that good or service, companies like Airbnb and Uber 
facilitate these connections almost instantaneously.  These companies also
provide a range of trust verification devices, such as publicly available 
user reviews and payment processing, that significantly lower the transaction 
costs associated with “stranger sharing.”128  The result is that massive numbers
of strangers are now engaging in one-time, small-scale transactions. 
The sharing economy’s growth is partly attributable to the fact that the 
particular configuration of scale in the sharing economy offers participants 
the opportunity for resource maximization and risk minimization.  From
 127. Id. at 529 (citing Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being 
Sued to Death, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/ 
3042248/the-gig-economy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death) [https://perma.cc/
RW4F-XY68]). 
128. See  JULIET SCHOR, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE, DEBATING THE SHARING
ECONOMY 7 (Oct. 2014), http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications/Schor_
Debating_the_Sharing_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9656-NGJB] (using the term “stranger 
sharing” to describe sharing economy transactions “among people who do not know each
other and who do not have friends or connections in common”). 
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the provider’s perspective, it enables her to engage in relatively low-risk
entrepreneurial activities.129 Anyone who has an asset—whether it is a spare
bedroom, a seat in their car, or a parking spot—can become a micro-
entrepreneur. Unlike Avis or Hilton, each individual micro-entrepreneur 
may engage in their business only a few hours a week or a few nights a 
month; the remainder of the time, the asset remains available for their 
personal use. The sharing economy thus puts  entrepreneurial activity within 
the reach of a larger swath of the population than possible under traditional 
business-to-consumer models.130 
On the other end of sharing economy transactions, users also benefit
from scale.  By making it possible to access goods like cars or tools only 
when needed and only in the amount needed, the sharing economy lowers 
the cost of use of many goods and services.  Peer-to-peer platforms like 
Uber and Airbnb may therefore expand access to goods and services to
people who otherwise would not have been able to afford them.  For 
example, an apartment or bedroom on Airbnb may be less expensive than
a hotel room in the same neighborhood, and an Uber ride may cost less 
than a taxi fare to the same destination.131  The availability of ride-hailing 
129. The key words here are “relatively” and “entrepreneurial.”  There are still risks 
to participants in the sharing economy, whether that a host’s home on Airbnb will be
damaged by a guest, or that a passenger using Uber will be assaulted by her driver (or vice
versa). See Nicholas Pell, Risky Business? Airbnb, Uber, and Insurance in the Sharing 
Economy, SIMPLE DOLLAR (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.thesimpledollar.com/uber-insurance- 
sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/D8LR-DAWE].  But in terms of economic risks, 
engaging in small-scale activities such as being an Airbnb host is a relatively less risky 
endeavor than opening a traditional bed and breakfast. See Nina Feldman, B&B vs.
Airbnb: Competition and Common Ground Between Traditional Inns and the New Sharing
Economy, 89.9 WWNO NEW ORLEANS PUB. RADIO (Aug. 7, 2014), http://wwno.org/post/ 
bb-vs-airbnb-competition-and-common-ground-between-traditional-inns-and-new-sharing- 
economy [https://perma.cc/C3RK-RBCD].
130. However, the ability of the sharing economy to provide a sustainable income
has been criticized. See Sarah Kessler, Pixel & Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in the Gig 
Economy, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.fastcompany.com/3027355/pixel­
and-dimed-on-not-getting-by-in-the-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/3CGU-RDA5] (discussing
the economic hardship faced by numerous individuals who could not obtain full-time 
employment and relied solely on sharing economy activities for income). 
131. See Emily Badger, The Real Promise of the “Sharing Economy” Is What It
Could Do for the Poor, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonkblog/wp/2015/03/16/the-real-promise-of-the-sharing-economy-is-what-it-could-do­
for-the-poor/ (quoting studies that finding that the sharing economy “creates this opportunity
for people to be able to get stuff and experience stuff that they wouldn’t otherwise be able 
to afford” and claiming that “[a]ny time you create a rental alternative for goods that
previously had to be owned, that benefits people who couldn’t afford to buy those goods 
before” (citing Samuel P. Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-to-Peer Rental Markets
in the Sharing Economy, NYU STERN SCH. BUS. RES. PAPER (manuscript at 3), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574337 [https://perma.cc/4JV2-BUHQ])). 
978
ZALE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018 3:43 PM     
  













   











       
    
[VOL. 53:  949, 2016] When Everything is Small
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
may make it feasible for a two-car family to downsize to one car,132 or for 
someone who lives just a little too far from the train station to use public 
transportation.133 
The next section considers in more detail the role platforms like Airbnb 
and Uber play in facilitating these peer-to-peer transactions in the sharing 
economy.
B. The Role of Platforms 
While informal home-sharing and ride-hailing transactions occurred
before the emergence of companies like Uber and Airbnb, the massive 
scale on which these activities are now taking place is directly due to the 
technology harnessed by platforms to connect users, transact payments,
and create trust verification mechanisms.134  Companies like Uber and Airbnb, 
which create a network of users whose activities in turn create value for 
the company, are known as network orchestrators in the economic literature.135 
The network orchestrator business model leverages a phenomenon 
known as network effects. Also known as demand-side economies of scale, 
network effects occur when the value of a good or service increases as the 
number of people using it increases.136  Each individual user’s decision to
participate in the network not only benefits that user by increasing the 
utility of the network for them, but also creates positive externalities by
making the network more valuable to other participants, the public, and
 132. Personal Car Sharing Comes to L.A., L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 5, 2012, 4:01 AM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/home_blog/2012/03/la-personal-car-share.html [https:// 
perma.cc/967S-FNV8] (quoting Shelby Clark, founder of Turo (formerly RelayRides): “A 
lot of families always need one car and sometimes need two.  [Currently] their only option
is to round up.  The only way to access that car when they need it is to own one.”). 
133. For example, according to Lyft, more than twenty percent of Lyft rides in the 
San Francisco Bay Area start or end near a BART or Caltrain stop. Paving the Way for 
Greener Cities, LYFT BLOG (Apr. 22, 2015), https://blog.lyft.com/posts/earthday.
134. This is not to say peer-to-peer transactions require a third-party facilitator; Bitcoin
is an example of how the large-scale occurrence of small-scale activities is possible
without such a facilitator. See Catherine Clifford, The Future of the Sharing Economy Is 
a World Built Like Bitcoin, ENTREPRENEUR (June 12, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur. 
com/article/234804 [https://perma.cc/V3P4-V44S].
135. See Barry Libert et al., What Airbnb, Uber and Alibaba Have in Common, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/11/what-airbnb-uber-and-alibaba­
have-in-common [https://perma.cc/AJ2E-ZYDD] (defining network orchestrators). 
136. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 174–75 (1999). “The value of a network goes up as the square 
of the number of users.”  Id. at 184. 
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the network orchestrator.  Participants benefit from network effects because 
the more participants there are in a particular network, the more efficient
that network is likely to be in facilitating transactions.137  For example, the
more people that join a ride-sharing network, the more likely both drivers 
will be able to find passengers in need of rides and the more likely riders 
will be able to find drivers able to provide them with a ride. 
The public can also benefit from network effects because the network 
may make socially desirable activity that was previously difficult to achieve 
feasible. For example, UberPool and LyftLine are specialized services in
which the driver picks up several riders along the route who are going in 
generally the same direction; the service costs less for riders than the 
typical Uber or Lyft service.138 Because the underlying apps are so popular, 
these services have the potential to make carpooling139 a far more viable
option than it has ever previously been.  The potential associated results— 
fewer cars on the road, lower emissions, and less congestion—benefit not 
only participants in the network but also members of the public at large.140 
Most crucially, network effects benefit network orchestrators.  The more 
individuals who join a network, the more valuable that network is.141  As
more people use the product or service that is the subject of the network, 
the platform gains more members, typically resulting in a monetary gain
 137. See Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation
Models Well-Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 2368 (2015) (“By participating in the largest network, the user maximizes 
their selection and speed in encountering an acceptable transaction opportunity.”).
However, network effects are not necessarily infinite; at some point, increasing amounts 
of small-scale activity on the network may no longer produce increasing returns.  See Mark 
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 497–98 (1998) (“The presumed increasing returns of network markets
are not guaranteed; networks will suffer net diseconomies of scale if the volume of
interactions exceeds network capacity and causes delays or failure.”).
138. See Meet Lyft Line, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/line [https://perma.cc/Z8EQ­
RLL4] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (describing Lyft Line as “an affordable new way to ride,” in
which passengers “[s]hare the ride with others going the same way, and pay up to 60% less;”); 
see also UberPOOL: Share Your Ride and Save, UBER, https://get.uber.com/cl/uberpool/
[https://perma.cc/MXJ8-3D94] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (describing Uber’s shared ride 
service comparable to Lyft Line).
139. Or at least a form of carpooling, since Lyft Line and Uber Pool are arguably not 
true carpooling, which utilizes otherwise unused capacity (in the form of empty seats in a 
car).  See Tanya Snyder, Uber and Lyft Take a Step Toward Real Ride-Sharing, STREETSBLOG
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://usa.streetsblog.org/2014/08/08/uber-and-lyft-take-a-step-toward­
real-ride-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/TEY6-VR34].
140. Note, however, this is a merely a potential benefit at this point. See infra Section
II.C (discussing the potential negative cumulative impacts of ride-hailing on emissions 
and congestion). 
141. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 137, at 495 (describing the benefits of network 
effects to the network creator). 
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for the platform.  For example, Airbnb charges commission fees to both 
guests and hosts on every home-sharing transaction; the more guests and
hosts there are on the network, the greater the number of home-sharing 
transactions that are likely to occur, and the more fees the company collects.142 
Furthermore, network effects are self-perpetuating: because the largest
network offers the most connections to others, new users are likely to gravitate
towards that network, making it even larger and more attractive to future
users and so on.143  As Reid Hoffman, founder of LinkedIn, put it: “First-
scaler advantage beats first-mover advantage.”144 
While any company that facilitates interconnection between users may
benefit from network effects,145 network orchestrators like Uber and Airbnb 
receive an amplified benefit from network effects.  These companies do 
not own the underlying assets that are the subject of their business model.146 
Unlike their non-sharing economy competitors, such as hotels and rental 
142. Airbnb collects a three percent commission from hosts, as well as a non-refundable 
six to twelve percent guest fee. What Are Host Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.
airbnb.com/support/article/63 [https://perma.cc/SG3B-ZQE9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); 
What Are Guest Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/support/article/104 
[https://perma.cc/JKB8-XUUW] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  Ride-hailing companies like 
Uber and Lyft charge commissions ranging from twenty to thirty percent of drivers’ total 
ride earnings.  See Dara Kerr, Uber Tests Taking 30% Commission from New Drivers, 
CNET (May 18, 2015, 6:43 PM) http://www.cnet.com/news/uber-tests-30-commission­
for-new-drivers-in-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/SGC9-XQUA].
143. See Tim Wu, In the Grip of the New Monopolists, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2010, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704635704575604993311538482 
(“A single firm can dominate the market if the product becomes more valuable to each 
user as the number of users rises.  Such networks have a natural tendency to grow, and that 
growth leads to dominance.”).
144. Reid Hoffman, Expertise in Scaling up Is the Visible Secret of Silicon Valley, 
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/39001312-4836-11e5-af2f­
4d6e0e5eda22; [https://perma.cc/ZZZ2-9TS5]; see also BRHMIE BALARAM, FAIR SHARE:
RECLAIMING POWER IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 13 (2016), https://www.thersa.org/discover/ 
publications-and-articles/reports/fair-share-reclaiming-power-in-the-sharing-economy [https:// 
perma.cc/2RNP-DW8F] (click “DOWNLOAD REPORT” button) (“When you can enable 
a community of users online, that community is also infinitely scalable, and thus infinitely
valuable, because there needn’t be a limit to numbers.”).
145. See Avitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179, 1182 (2003). 
146.  Nor do they employ the people who provide the services that are the subject of 
their business model.  Whether sharing economy companies are in an employer–
employee relationship is the subject of significant dispute. See Davey Alba, Many More 
Drivers Can Now Join the Class Action Suit Against Uber (Dec. 9, 2015, 8:02 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2015/12/uber-class-action-suit-expands/ [https://perma.cc/89G2­
HY8B] (discussing the class action lawsuit filed by Uber drivers against the company
regarding employment status). 
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car companies, network orchestrators like Airbnb and Uber leverage the 
assets of the network participants—their houses, apartments, and cars— 
thereby minimizing the companies’ risk and expenses.  Economists have
recognized that network orchestrators “outperform companies with other 
business models on both compound annual growth rate and profit margin.”147 
This is in part because “the value creation performed by the network on 
behalf of the organization reduces the company’s marginal cost.”148 The
multi-billion dollar market capitalizations of companies like Uber and
Airbnb—valued at $50 billion and $25 billion, respectively—indicates just 
how highly investors value the massive numbers of small-scale activities 
occurring on these networks.149 
Network orchestrators like Uber and Airbnb have not just facilitated 
ride-hailing and home-sharing networks; they have also created massive
data networks.  Sharing economy companies have data about each and
every small-scale activity that occurs on their network. Unlike pre-sharing 
economy ride-hailing and home-sharing activities—such as people renting 
rooms to boarders or using gypsy cabs—which were largely ad hoc, one­
time, unmonitored—and unmonitor-able—transactions, there is data about 
every home-sharing transaction that occurs on Airbnb and every ride-hailing 
transaction that occurs on Uber. The identities of the parties engaged in
the transactions; the location, time, and distance of the transactions; and 
the amount of money exchanged in the transaction—all of this information is
captured by the platforms and available to be monetized.150 
A final item of note about network orchestrators like Uber and Lyft is 
that their business model diverges from the traditional, two-sided model
of commercial activity between industry and consumers. Instead, the sharing 
economy’s model is a three-sided one, involving platforms, users—namely,
ride-hailing passengers or home-sharing guests—and providers, namely, 
147.  Libert et al., supra note 135 (emphasis added). 
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. See Austin et al., supra note 7 (listing Uber’s valuation as $68.0 billion and
Airbnb’s as $25.5 billion, as of September 2016); see also CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG
TAIL 23 (2006) (quoting a venture capital investor’s comment that “[t]he biggest money is 
in the smallest sales”).
150. See Russell Walker, Big Data Monetization Lessons from the Sharing Economy, 
DATAINFORMED (Apr. 6, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://data-informed.com/big-data-monetization- 
lessons-from-the-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/H8GL-7HQY].  This data may be as
valuable as, if not more valuable than, the actual transactions occurring in the sharing 
economy. Id.  Challenging questions beyond the scope of this paper are raised about the 
sharing economy’s creation of new information and how that information should be used. 
See generally The Feasibility of Measuring the Sharing Economy, OFFICE FOR NAT’L 
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ride-hailing drivers or home-sharing hosts.  Further complicating the 
picture is the fact that most providers would be treated as consumers under 
the two-sided model, but under a three-sided model, their role is less clear. 
They supply services like transportation and accommodation, but they are
not necessarily professionals engaged in this activity; they are using personal 
assets, like their vehicles and residences, but doing so for commercial
reasons. As the next Section will discuss, adapting regulation to respond 
to this three-sided model has proven to be challenging.
C. Implications of Scale in the Sharing Economy 
The previous Sections provided a descriptive account of the sharing 
economy and the role of network orchestrators like Airbnb and Uber in 
facilitating small-scale activities on a large scale.  This Section develops 
the case for a regulatory response to these small-scale activities on three 
grounds.  First, negative cumulative impacts can result from large numbers
of small-scale home-sharing and ride-hailing activities, such as decreased
long-term rental availability and increases in vehicle congestion and emissions. 
Second, existing regulations are not designed for the three-sided, network 
orchestrator model of the sharing economy, and the failure to address this 
misfit is producing regulatory fractures that threaten to undermine civil 
rights laws and other important public policies.  Finally, the justifications 
for regulatory leniency, such as concerns about privacy, enforcement costs,
and alternate forms of regulation, do not apply with full force to small-scale 
activities in the sharing economy.
1. Cumulative Impacts 
Large numbers of small-scale activities are crucial to the success of the 
sharing economy: network effects depend on there being enough drivers 
for all the passengers who want rides and enough passengers for all the
drivers who want fares.  For platforms like Airbnb and Uber, the more small-
scale activity, the better. But while network orchestrators may benefit from 
network effects as the network grows larger and the number of individual 
transactions increases, the large-scale occurrence of small-scale home-
sharing and ride-hailing can have a range of negative cumulative impacts.151 
151. There are positive benefits of the cumulative impacts of activities in the sharing 
economy, primarily network effects. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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Consider someone renting out his or her own apartment on Airbnb a
few days a month.  As a discrete, stand-alone action, this small-scale activity 
likely creates few, if any, negative impacts.  However, multiply it by the 
hundreds or thousands, as is happening in many major U.S. cities, and the
cumulative effects become apparent.  For example, residents in cities from 
Los Angeles to New York have experienced increased noise and safety
concerns, as well as traffic and parking congestion from increasing amounts
of home-sharing activity in their neighborhood or buildings.152  As the  
number of people engaged in home-sharing grows, formerly residential 
neighborhoods or resident-occupied buildings have become flooded with 
an influx of transitory individuals, who may not be familiar with—or may
not care about—legal rules such as parking restrictions or informal norms
such as noise considerations in buildings with thin walls.153  While the extent
of these impacts will necessarily vary by individual home-sharing transaction, 
the more transactions there are in a concentrated area, the more the negative
impacts are likely to occur. 
The large-scale occurrence of home-sharing activity has also raised 
concerns about more subtle changes in the character of neighborhoods.
When short-term rentals proliferate, what had been a residential neighborhood
essentially becomes de facto rezoned to one that is more like a mixed-use
or commercial area as properties are used more intensively for commercial
activity.154  While this change in neighborhood character could ultimately 
152. See, e.g., Josh Dawsey, Airbnb Faces Scrutiny from New York City Officials, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2015, 6:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/Airbnb-faces-scrutiny­
from-new-york-city-officials-1421795280 (“Residents who spoke at the [City Council]
hearing said they were uncomfortable with people they didn’t know using shared services 
and having access to their buildings.  Some brought up issues with noise.”); Steven Leigh 
Morris, Airbnb is Infuriating the Neighbors.  Is It Time for New Rules?, L.A. WKLY., (Jan. 
22, 2015, 2:47 PM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/Airbnb-is-infuriating-the-neighbors­
is-it-time-for-new-rules-5343663 [https://perma.cc/S5YP-2247] (“[M]ajor problems recur 
with ‘one-nighters in town for a good time, and consideration for others just isn’t a
priority.’”); Emily Alpert Reyes, New Soldiers in Airbnb Battle: PR and Politics, L.A.
TIMES ((Apr. 4, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-adv­
airbnb-politics-20150405-story.html#page=2 [https://perma.cc/4YVN-3D8V] (quoting an 
opponent of home-sharing as saying “I don’t know who my neighbors are . . . . It’s like 
suddenly having a bar or a restaurant next to your house instead of a family.”). 
153. See Reyes, supra note 152. 
154. Venice, California is perhaps the best (or worst) example of this kind of
neighborhood transformation.  While the beach neighborhood has always been attractive 
to visitors, a 2015 study found that “in census tracts along Venice Beach and Abbott-
Kinney Boulevard [the primary commercial thoroughfare], Airbnb listings accounted for
6% to 7% of all housing units—about 10 times the countywide average.”  Tim Logan et
al., Airbnb and Other Short-Term Rentals Worsen Housing Shortage, Critics Say, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi­
airbnb-housing-market-20150311-story.html [https://perma.cc/4SG8-NC28].  Estimates 
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be a positive outcome from the perspective of urban planning,155 the cumulative
impact of large amounts of home-sharing activity in a neighborhood is 
likely to be perceived as a negative outcome by residents who purchased
property in what they thought was a residential neighborhood.156 
In addition to the negative cumulative impacts from concentrated
amounts of home-sharing in particular neighborhoods or buildings, the 
large-scale occurrence of small-scale home-sharing activities can result in 
negative cumulative impacts in long-term rental markets.  In a number of 
cities, the increasing numbers of short-term rentals have been cited as a
factor in rising housing costs and decreasing availability of long-term rental 
housing.157 As large numbers of tenants under long-term leases rent out their 
apartments on home-sharing platforms like Airbnb,158 landlords rationally
indicate that short-term rentals in Venice had tripled in the one-year period from 2013 to 
2014. Id. 
155. See, e.g., Emily Badger, Mixed-Use Neighborhoods May Be Safer, Too, ATLANTIC:
CITYLAB (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2013/03/mixed-use-neighborhoods­
may-be-safer-ones-too/4962/ [https://perma.cc/Y8LY-LLR3] (discussing the health, safety,
environmental, and quality-of-life benefits of mixed-use zoning). 
156. See, e.g., Walter Hamilton, In Silver Lake, Some Have Reservations About 
Vacation Rental Website, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/ 
sep/02/business/la-fi-airbnb-economy-20130903 [https://perma.cc/2U6X-7X2M] (noting 
that one justification for the proposed ban on short-term rentals in Silver Lake was 
concerns about negative impacts on property value). 
157. See, e.g., Reyes, supra note 152 (noting that approximately seven thousand 
rental units had been removed from the long-term rental market for short-term rentals 
during the time Airbnb had been operating in the city; (citing ROY SAMAAN, LAANE,
AIRBNB, RISING RENT, AND THE HOUSING CRISIS IN LOS ANGELES 3, 16 (Mar. 2015),
http://www.laane.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AirBnB-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FJ2L-2FNB])); see also Dayne Lee, Note, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate 
Los Angeles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 229 (2016) (discussing the implications of Airbnb on Los 
Angeles’s housing market). But see Coral Garnick, Airbnb Says Its Rentals Aren’t Affecting 
Local Housing Affordability, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/ 
business/airbnb-says-its-rentals-arent-affecting-housing-affordability/ (noting that an Airbnb
study of the Seattle market found that “hosts are renting short-term for less money than 
they could earn on the long-term market, suggesting that hosts are not materially decreasing the
housing supply” (citing Airbnb and the City of Seattle, AIRBNB 3 (Dec. 2015), https:// 
1zxiw0vqx0oryvpz3ikczauf-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Airbn
bandtheCityofSeattle.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PXK-LWD6])).
158. While long-term leases may forbid tenants from offering short-term rentals,
many tenants with such restrictions nonetheless engage in short-term rental activities.  See 
Ashley Peterson, No Assignment, Sublease . . . or Airbnb?, SAN DIEGO CTY. B. ASS’N: FOR 
THE REC. (Mar. 2016), available at https://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=FTR-Mar-2016­
4 [https://perma.cc/Q362-66EW] (noting that “many standard landlord/tenant form leases
contain a ‘no assignment’ and/or ‘no sublease’ clause . . . . The majority of tenants,
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want to capture the higher rents for short-term rentals themselves.159 
Therefore, landlords are incentivized to take units out of the long-term 
rental market and move them into the more profitable short-term rental 
market.160 Furthermore, even those landlords who do not remove their rental 
units from the long-term rental market may raise rents in an attempt to capture 
short-term rental revenue they assume their tenants will engage in—legally
or not.  As a result, long-term rental housing supply goes down, and rental 
costs go up—for everyone, not just those who operate as Airbnb hosts.161 
Negative cumulative impacts can also result in the form of increased 
burdens on public infrastructure and other public goods and services.
Short-term accommodations like hotels and traditional B&Bs typically 
charge transient occupancy taxes to fund the infrastructure and amenities
that visitors use and expect while they are in the jurisdiction—such as
roads, public transportation, police, and parks.162  Thus, it seems appropriate
however, probably do not know what a sublease is, or that Airbnb rentals could qualify as 
such”); see also Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for-airbnb-hosts­
who-may-be-breaking-the-law.html?_r=0 (“[Airbnb] avoids educating the people who
provide its inventory. . . . given how many listings on the site come from hosts who are 
breaking the law or the terms of their lease or their condominium board rules”); Carolyn 
Said, Airbnb Sublets in S.F. Land Some Renters in the Doghouse, S.F. CHRON. GATE, (Mar. 
18, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Airbnb-sublets-in-S-F-land­
some-renters-in-the-5326019.php [https://perma.cc/9X32-6VFY] (“Thousands of San
Franciscans make extra money by renting out their home or a room to travelers via Airbnb.
Considering about two-thirds of city residents are renters, many local hosts don’t own their 
places.”); Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for-airbnb-hosts-who­
may-be-breaking-the-law.html?_r=0 (pointing out the inconsistency in the fact that Airbnb 
“[Airbnb] avoids educating the people who provide its inventory . . . given how many
listings on the site come from hosts who are breaking the law or the terms of their lease or 
their condominium board rules.”). 
159. See Said, supra note 158 (“Landlords are pissed off that tenants are profiting 
off their properties . . . . It makes them crazy: They’re rent controlled, and the tenant is 
making more off their property than they can make.” (internal quotations omitted))). 
160. In cities with rent control, landlords may not be able to easily remove units from 
the long-term market. See id.  But if tenants are engaged in home-sharing in violation of 
their lease, doing so provides the landlord with grounds for eviction, allowing the unit to
be re-let to a new long-term tenant at current market rates. See Lieber, supra note 158 
(describing how an apartment owners’ association in San Francisco uses this tactic to evict
tenants).
161. While these shifts in the housing market may simply be pricing signals that will, 
in the long term, allow the market to reallocate resources, and low vacancy rates may result
in market pressure to construct more rental housing, in the short- to medium-term, the 
impacts of decreased rental availability and increased rents on residents is something that 
cities may not be able to wait for the market to address. 
162. See, e.g., Transient Occupancy Tax, COUNTY OF SONOMA, http://sonoma­
county.org/tax/tot/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9VVB-8FY3] (last updated Nov. 7, 2016);
Transient Occupancy Tax, FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/dta/transient_ 
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to impose some level of transient occupancy taxes on Airbnb guests, who
are likely to use city infrastructure and amenities in a manner similar to,
if not exactly the same as, hotel guests.163 And in many cases, local laws
do in fact require that short-term hosts like Airbnb host pay some sort
of transient occupancy tax.  However, except in those jurisdictions where 
Airbnb has agreed to facilitate the collection of taxes directly through its 
platform,164 many users do not pay the tax, and it is all but impossible for
cities to directly enforce the tax collection because the costs—dedicated
staff, enforcement activity, and other such costs—would most likely exceed
the amount of revenue collected.165  While the failure to pay transient
occupancy tax on a single home-sharing transaction may have no discernable 
effect on a city’s budget, the loss of tax revenue from hundreds of thousands 
of home-sharing transactions—which make up an ever-larger segment of 
the overall short-term accommodation market in many cities—means the
local citizenry who are the intended beneficiaries of the uncollected tax
occupancy_tax.htm [https://perma.cc/B66E-LRJK] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); Transient 
Occupancy Tax, MY NEV. COUNTY (Feb. 14, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.mynevadacounty.
com/nc/ttc/Pages/Transient-Occupancy-Tax-.aspx [https://perma.cc/QWH9-8NG3].  Transient
occupancy taxes are also appealing to local governments because there is no natural 
constituency to resist them—the people who pay them are typically travelers, who do not 
live in the jurisdiction, and thus who can’t vote out the politicians who raise these taxes. 
See Cory Briggs, Who Runs San Diego: The Use and Abuse of the Transient Occupancy 
Tax, SAN DIEGO FREE PRESS (Sept. 3, 2014), http://sandiegofreepress.org/2014/09/who­
runs-san-diego-the-use-and-abuse-of-the-transient-occupancy-tax/ [https://perma.cc/ZCP3­
M4H3].
163. See Emily Badger, Airbnb Is About to Start Collecting Hotel Taxes in More Major 
Cities, Including Washington, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/29/airbnb-is-about-to-start-collecting-hotel-taxes-in-more­
major-cities-including-washington/ (quoting a tax official in Washington, D.C. as saying 
“Airbnb hosts should have been registering with the city and collecting the tax, which
supports both a convention center fund and the city’s general fund—and, ultimately, 
services like the fire and police departments”).
164. The list of jurisdictions where Airbnb facilitates the collection and remittance 
of state or local occupancy taxes has steadily grown, although it still represents only a portion 
of locations where Airbnb has listings. See In What Areas is Occupancy Tax Collection
and Remittance by Airbnb Available?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653/
in-what-areas-is-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-by-airbnb-available [https://perma.
cc/MM4C-2JUJ] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
165. See Badger, supra note 163 (discussing payment of Washington D.C.’s transient
occupancy tax by home-sharing users where city officials “acknowledged that some residents 
in the city haven’t been paying this tax as they should”).
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bear a greater burden, in the form of higher taxes or lowered level of services 
and infrastructure maintenance.166 
The picture of cumulative impacts from ride-hailing is less clear-cut 
than for home-sharing, in part because there is limited empirical evidence 
to date, and in part because the evidence that does exist paints a mixed 
picture of the impacts.167  However, two areas of particular concern for 
negative cumulative impacts are emissions and congestion.  On one hand, 
ride-hailing in the long term has the potential to decrease vehicle ownership, 
and thereby reduce both traffic congestion and emissions.168  Not only would 
there be fewer cars on the road, thereby directly reducing emissions and 
congestion, there might be potential indirect reductions in emissions from 
manufacturing, as demand for vehicles goes down.  In addition, the carpooling
services offered by ride-hailing platforms have the potential to make
carpooling a viable transportation option that also reduces the number of
vehicles on the road.169 
But to date, these positive cumulative impacts of ride-hailing are largely 
theoretical.  Instead, evidence from a number of cities indicates that the
cumulative impact of ride-hailing may be to increase the number of vehicles
on the road, with associated increases in congestion.  In New York City, 
for example, a 2015 study using Uber’s own data found that the effect of 
the additional number of vehicles on the road for Uber reduced traffic 
speeds by 7.7%.170  In London, the number of private vehicles for hire
 166. Sharing Economy Guide, supra note 77, at 10–11. 
167. See, e.g., Steven Hill, Is the Sharing Economy Truly Green?, SIERRA CLUB
(Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2016-2-march-april/green-life/sharing­
economy-truly-green [https://perma.cc/F5U4-VN5C] (noting that “hard data on the environmental 
benefits of the sharing economy is difficult to come by.  Many green claims are anecdotal. . .”); 
Chris Roberts, The Unstudied Traffic Impacts of Uber and Lyft, S.F. WKLY. (Apr. 20,
2016), http://archives.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/the-unstudied-traffic-impacts-of-uber­
and-lyft-news-traffic-rideshare-development-uber-lyft/Content?oid=4626985 [https://perma. 
cc/UV7V-ND8R] (noting that “there is little data on the impact on traffic caused by the
‘companies’ drivers”). 
168. See Natasha Lomas, Let’s Talk About Uber, Congestion, and Urban Air
Quality, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 26, 2015) https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/26/uber-london­
impact/ [https://perma.cc/95VV-5Y5E] (discussing Uber’s claims that each Uber in London
takes “seven and half cars off the road” (citing Ian Silvera, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick: 
We Will Have 42,000 London Drivers in 2016, IB TIMES (Oct. 3, 2014, 4:34 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-we-will-have-42000-london-drivers­
2016-1468436 [https://perma.cc/5EQS-GPKW] (emphasis omitted)))). 
169. Farhad Manjoo, Car-Pooling Helps Uber Go the Extra Mile, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/technology/car-pooling-helps-uber-go­
the-extra-mile.html?_r=0 (discussing the potential of UberPool and LyftLine). 
170. See Stephen Miller, Uber’s Own Numbers Show It’s Making Traffic Worse, 
STREETSBLOG (July 22, 2015), http://www.streetsblog.org/2015/07/22/ubers-own-data­
reveals-it-slows-manhattan-traffic-9-percent/ [https://perma.cc/UP5H-5NDN] (citing a 
transportation analyst’s study of Uber’s data). 
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operating on city streets—a category that includes vehicles used for ride­
hailing—jumped 25% between 2013 and 2015.171  In the capital of the
Philippines, Manila, ride-hailing “add[s] an estimated 10,000 to 15,000
vehicles to the roads at a time when there are reportedly more than 200 
cars for every mile of road in the capital.”172 
Furthermore, while some individuals may decide against car ownership 
because of the availability of ride-hailing, others may choose to invest in
a car in order to become a ride-hailing driver.  Uber and Lyft actively encourage
such investments with their leasing programs, Uber Xchange and Lyft 
Express Drive.173  The programs are marketed to individuals who want to
be drivers but who do not have their own vehicle, or whose vehicle does 
not meet the standards required by Uber and Lyft.174  Thus, such leasing 
programs may potentially increase the overall number of vehicles on the
road.175 
While overall emissions from vehicles may eventually decrease if more
people opt out of vehicle purchases because of the availability of ride-
hailing, if the services simply result in a one-to-one substitution for trips 
that would have been driven in personal vehicles or taxis, the cumulative 
171. See Lomas, supra note 168 (citing data from U.K. government’s Department 
for Transport, DEP’T FOR TRANSP., TAXI AND PRIVATE HIRE VEHICLE STATISTICS: ENGLAND 
2015, at 2–3, 10 (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/456733/taxi-private-hire-vehicles-statistics-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QU25-7DWN]). 
172. Davey Alba, In the City with the World’s Worst Traffic, Uber IIs an Awkward 
Fit, WIRED ((Dec. 12, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/in-a-city-with-the­
worlds-worst-traffic-uber-tries-to-fit-in/ [https://perma.cc/HE2L-NRDJ] (“Instead of car 
owners registering to work on the platform, operators with an entrepreneurial spirit typically
buy small fleets of brand new cars and hire individual drivers—essentially layering a new 
middleman on top of Uber and other platforms.  These are brand new cars that are being
added to Manila’s roads.”). 
173. See Express Drive Rental Car Program, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/
articles/218196557-Express-Drive-Rental-Car-Program- [https://perma.cc/JMJ7-8SBZ] (last
visited Nov. 7, 2016); Drive with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/signup/drive/xchange-
new/ [https://perma.cc/5EER-CQAH] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
174. Id. 
175. These programs also raise consumer protection concerns, since the costs can be
far higher than a conventional car lease.  For example, one driver reported paying $160 
per week for a used Ford Escape (approximately $640/month); another driver was charged
$870 per month and was still charged for the vehicle even after Uber deactivated him because 
of a poor review by a passenger.  Sarah Skidmore Sell, Desperately Seeking Drivers, Uber
and Lyft Offer Car Options, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 22, 2016, 1:51 PM). 
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impact on emissions may be neutral, or even negative.176 Because ride-
hailing platforms offer a cheap and convenient service, there is evidence 
that those who would otherwise use public transportation may instead use 
Uber or Lyft, thus actually increasing overall emissions.177  Concerns have
also been raised that unless ride-hailing services take steps to increase the 
use of electric or low-emission vehicles among their drivers or make their
carpooling services a larger proportion of the overall rides provided, the 
cumulative impacts of ride-hailing may ultimately be higher emissions.
As one researcher has noted, “[t]he companies can’t have it both ways— 
creating new economic activity and reducing carbon emissions—because 
the two are closely linked.”178
 176. See SCHOR, supra note 128, at 6 (“[Ridehailing and carsharing activities resulted in]
a measurable reduction in greenhouse gas emissions [but] only because of substantial 
reductions from a small fraction of households.  For the majority, carsharing, by expanding
access to cars, increased emissions.” (citing ELLIOT W. MARTIN & SUSAN A. SHAHEEN, MINETA
TRANSP. INST., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION IMPACTS OF CARSHARING IN NORTH AMERICA
33–35, 38–41 (June 2010), http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/
Carsharing%20and%20Co2%20%286.23.2010%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EUA-6CDK])).
The substitution of ride-sharing for taxi service raises particular concerns because in many
cities, a certain percentage of taxi fleets must be low emissions or hybrid vehicles; it is 
unclear if a similar percentage of ride-sharing vehicles are similarly green.  See Brad Berman,
SF Taxi Driver Wages 10-Year Battle to Reduce Fleet Emissions, and Wins, HYBRIDCARS
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.hybridcars.com/sf-taxi-driver-wages-10-year-battle-reduce­
fleet-emissions-and-wins-28788/ [https://perma.cc/Y39F-5GJB]; Carmel DeAmicis, Why 
Ridesharing Companies Like Uber and Lyft Have Yet to Prove Their Environmental
Friendliness, GIGAOM (Sept. 21, 2014, 6:25 PM), https://gigaom.com/2014/09/21/why­
ridesharing-companies-like-uber-and-lyft-have-yet-to-prove-their-environmental-friendliness/
[https://perma.cc/FN2E-MCDJ].
177. See Hill, supra note 167 (“[Almost half of respondents indicated] that if they
had not had the option of using a ride-sharing service, they would have instead used a bike,
public bus, or train, or simply walked.  Ride-sharing is taking away business, not just from 
traditional taxis, but also from more low-carbon modes of travel.” (citing LISA RAYLE ET 
AL., UNIV. OF CAL. TRANSP. CTR., APP-BASED, ON-DEMAND RIDE SERVICES: COMPARING
TAXI AND RIDESOURCING TRIPS AND USER CHARACTERISTICS IN SAN FRANCISCO 13 tbl.3 
(Aug. 2014), http://www.uctc.net/research/papers/UCTC-FR-2014-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2VFB-62XZ])); see also Lomas, supra note 168 (challenging Uber’s CEO’s assertion that 
each Uber in London takes “seven and half cars off the road” and arguing that “[w]hat seems
closer to the truth is the (VC-subsidized) cost of taking an Uber is encouraging (some)
Londoners to step away from public transport and get into one of its partner’s cars . . .  [P]ublic
transport in London is both plentiful and generally cheaper than getting any kind of taxi.”). 
But see  AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N, SHARED MOBILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PUBLIC TRANSIT 4 (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter APTA Shared Mobility Report] (finding that 
shared mobility services such as Uber and Car2Go “substitute[d] more for private automobile
trips than public transit trips”).
178. SCHOR, supra note 128. 
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2. Regulatory Fractures 
In addition to the negative cumulative impacts from large numbers of 
individual home-sharing and ride-hailing activities, the unique arrangement
of scale in the sharing economy also exposes regulatory fractures that threaten
to undermine a range of civil rights and other laws.  Regulatory fractures 
refer to the misfit between existing regulations and new modes of activity.
As noted by Saskia Sassen in her scholarship on the underground economy, 
when activities “diverge from the model for which extant regulations were 
designed. . . . [and] take on a recognizable shape of their own, it becomes 
meaningless to speak of regulatory violations.”179 Like the related problem
of regulatory arbitrage,180 in which people deliberately shift activities to 
less governed spheres, regulatory fractures are problematic because activities
which may have “profound effects in a given state or market [are] placed
beyond . . . regulatory reach.”181  Regulatory fractures can result in massive
non-compliance by regulated parties, because they believe either that existing 
laws are inapplicable or that enforcement is unlikely.182 
In the case of the sharing economy, regulatory fractures are occuring 
because numerous regulations, from local zoning codes to state wage and
employment laws to federal civil rights laws like the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)183 and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA),184 do not map
neatly onto the sharing economy’s three-sided, network orchestrator model. 
These regulations have worked relatively well when the regulated activity 
179. Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old
Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2291 (1994). 
180. Regulatory arbitrage is the “legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting
rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs” by exploiting “the gap between the 
economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.”  Victor Fleischer, 
Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). Fleischer quotes a New Yorker 
cartoon caption that arguably explains regulatory arbitrage better than any legal definition:
“These new regulations will fundamentally change the way we get around them.” Id. at
228 (citations omitted). 
181. Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 
47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 73 (2014) (citing Joel F. Houston et al., Regulatory Arbitrage
and International Bank Flows, 67 J. FIN. 1845, 1892–93 (2012)). 
182. See Alba, supra note 172 (“[Uber] tends to barrel its way into a new country or
city without technically being legal and gets pushback from regulatory bodies, often in the 
form of a cease-and-desist or even an outright ban.  But Uber stays put.  Then, digging into its
cavernous coffers and unleashing its loyal user base, it lobbies and campaigns until regulators 
relent.  It almost always wins.”). 
183.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012) (ADA). 
184.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012). 
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involves the traditional two-party model of industry–consumers or employer– 
employees. But when applied to the sharing economy’s three-sided model,
many of these regulations break down. 
For example, the ADA requires “reasonable modifications” in the provision 
of public accommodations.185 But applying the ADA to ride-sharing activities
raises legal questions as well as practical difficulties.  Is Uber providing a
public accommodation?  And even if it is, how does the ADA apply to a
driver who uses his Honda partly for personal use and partly for commercial
ride-sharing?186  Platforms like Uber and Lyft have argued that since they
are simply aggregators of individual small-scale ride-sharing transactions, 
which are arguably not subject to the ADA, they are also not subject to 
the ADA.187 Furthermore, because platforms like Uber and Lyft do not own 
the personal vehicles used by drivers, the types of accessibility requirements
imposed on commercial taxi operators under the ADA—where usually, 
one entity owns the fleet of vehicles and must maintain a certain percentage
of the fleet as wheelchair accessible—may be ill-suited. 
The applicability of civil rights laws like the FHA and Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to home-sharing raises similar concerns.  Studies
have shown that minority hosts and guests have experienced systematic
discrimination when using home-sharing services like Airbnb, yet it is unclear 
if this discrimination is unlawful under existing regulatory models.188  For
example, the FHA’s “Mrs. Murphy” exception exempts property owners 
from compliance with the FHA’s anti-discrimination provisions in the 
sale or rental of housing if the owner lives in the property she rents out 
and it has fewer than four units.189  If an owner falls within this exception, 
she is permitted to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, religion, and other
protected classes in the selection of tenants.190  Arguably, as written, the
exemption might allow an owner of such a unit to list her property on 
185.  42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2012). 
186. See APTA Shared Mobility Report, supra note 177, at 24–29 (discussing these 
and other challenges in making ride-sharing accessible to disabled users, such as the fact
that liability concerns may attach for drivers who are not adequately trained in loading and
unloading mobility-impaired passengers). 
187. See Bob Egelko, Obama Administration Takes Sides in Disability Suit Against 
Uber, S.F. GATE (Dec. 23, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Obama- 
administration-takes-sides-in-disability-5976148.php [https://perma.cc/EDT2-LLBW] 
(discussing a Justice Department filing arguing that Uber is subject to the ADA and is liable if
its drivers refuse to provide service to blind passengers with service animals).
188. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
189.  42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2012). 
190. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 3604. As discussed in Section I.A.2, the justification for 
the Mrs. Murphy exception is personal autonomy concerns. See discussion supra Section 
I.A.2. 
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Airbnb and discriminate in the selection of guests, even though the owner 
is engaging in commercial activity and not staying on the premises.191 
While the Mrs. Murphy exception was criticized even before the rise 
of Airbnb,192 it raises particular concerns in the context of home-sharing. 
Applying the exemption to home-sharing may lead to outcomes that not 
only potentially undermine anti-discrimination policies, but which are also
illogical. Because the Mrs. Murphy exemption only applies to “owners,”193 
an Airbnb host who happened to own a four-unit or smaller property could
discriminate, while an Airbnb host who happened to be a tenant in the same 
property could not. While any extension in the coverage of the Mrs. Murphy
exception is troubling,194 having its applicability hinge on the whether an 
Airbnb host is a tenant or owner is illogical, when both home-sharing scenarios 
involve commercial activity and a host who is not occupying the unit at 
the same time as the guest. 
It may be tempting to dismiss these kinds of regulatory fractures as the 
natural consequence of innovation.  After all, the phenomenon of law lagging 
behind technology is not a new one; regulators have always struggled to
catch up with new technology.195  Furthermore, some might applaud
the regulatory disruption being caused by the sharing economy:  “the
regulator’s one guess [about regulation] could preclude the emergence at 
some later time of a valuable alternative made possible by some yet-
unknown technological advance.”196
 191. See Michael Todisco, Share and Share Alike?  Considering Racial Discrimination
in the Nascent Room-Sharing Economy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 124–25 (Mar. 14, 
2015), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/03/67_Stan_L_Rev_ 
Online_121_Todisco.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U23-9Q8F] (discussing factors in determining
whether Airbnb hosts would fall under the Mrs. Murphy exemption). 
192. See Walsh, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 607–09, supra note 56. 
193. Todisco, supra note 191, at 125. 
194. See id. at 125 (“This extension [of the Mrs. Murphy exemption] would breathe
new life into an unfortunate provision that looked moribund . . . .  [T]his extension would 
result in millions of new Mrs. Murphy rooms—nearly the equivalent impact of allowing 
the three largest hotel chains in the world to discriminate at will.”).
195. See, e.g., MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND 
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, at 66, 70 (1990) (describing the regulatory
challenges posed by the introduction of the automobile: “The rapidity with which these
devices spread throughout the social fabric, and the rich variety of regulatory problems that they
brought with them, posed a major additional challenge to the American polity. . . . New 
technology and rapid growth far outstripped the pace of regulation”). 
196. Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for Labor, 
Rewards, and Securities, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 46 (2015). 
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The sharing economy is undoubtedly creating economic opportunities 
and facilitating socially beneficial activities.  But the innovative ways in
which it is facilitating these activities should not mask the fact that the
underlying activities—providing short-term accommodation and transportation
to the public—are ones which we have important public policy reasons 
for regulating.197  As home-sharing and ride-hailing become increasingly 
large sectors of the accommodation and transportation markets, the 
distributional impacts of these activities are also likely to grow and regulatory 
models will need to adapt. 
3. Responding to Leniency Arguments 
The two preceding Sections have argued that a regulatory response to 
the small-scale activities in the sharing economy is appropriate because of 
the negative cumulative impacts from large numbers of small-scale activities 
and the resulting regulatory fracture that threaten to undermine civil rights
and other laws.  But what about the justifications for regulatory leniency 
for small-scale activities identified in Part I(A): de minimis character, privacy 
and autonomy concerns, enforcement costs, fairness concerns, and alternatives
to legal regulation?  This Section contends that each of these justifications
for regulatory leniency fails to apply with full force in the context of
home-sharing and ride-hailing.
First, while each stand-alone home-sharing or ride-hailing transaction 
is de minimis, the potential impacts of these activities—even on a stand­
alone basis—are not. For example, ride-hailing involves a personal interaction
in a stranger’s vehicle, raising the possibility of serious harms such as 
197. In addition to questions about the applicability of civil rights laws like the ADA 
and FHA to the sharing economy, similar questions are raised with respect to consumer 
protection laws and employment laws.  See, e.g., Kalev Leetaru, The $200 Uber Ride and 
the Realtime Data-Driven Sharing Economy, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2016, 9:28 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2016/01/02/the-200-uber-ride-and-the-realtime-data­
driven-sharing-economy/#f7e432305612 [https://perma.cc/GJR5-MUTU] (noting that unlike 
the taxi system, in which “all riders are officially considered equal, with no formal system
to jump to the front of the queue,” Uber’s surge pricing means service goes to who can
afford the increased fares first); see also Anand Giridharadas, Is Technology Fostering a 
Race to the Bottom?, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/us/ 
02iht-currents02.html?_r=2& (quoting the founder of Taskrabbit, an online platform for
outsourcing errand and tasks: “‘The consumer has the right to make their own choices 
about whom they hire to do work,’ said Ms. Busque, the founder.  She described the possibility
of discrimination in the choices as an ‘interesting perspective’ that she found unlikely, and
one that, in effect, is not TaskRabbit’s problem.”); Eric T. Schneiderman, Taming the
Digital Wild West, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/ 
opinion/taming-the-digital-wild-west.html?_r=0 (“[T]he ability to pay truly exorbitant prices
shouldn’t determine someone’s ability to get critical goods and services when they’re in
short supply in an emergency.”). 
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traffic accidents or physical assaults.198  While the likelihood of accidents
or assaults may be rare—and perhaps no more likely to occur in an Uber ride
than in a taxi199—the seriousness of the potential harm weakens the case
for regulatory leniency on de minimis grounds.200 
Second, claims for regulatory leniency on privacy and autonomy grounds
are significantly diminished because the “sharing-for-a-fee” activities taking 
place within the sharing economy fall squarely within the definition of 
commercial activities.201  Furthermore, although commercial activity may 
still implicate privacy concerns, particularly when it takes place in personal
spaces,202 the simple fact that home—sharing involves a home does not
198. Although Uber conducts internal background checks of drivers, there have been 
a number of highly publicized incidents of assaults by drivers who went through the
company’s internal background check.  See Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis
Safer than Uber?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2015/03/are-taxis-safer-than-uber/386207/ [https://perma.cc/K46M-Z7ZW] (“San Francisco
District Attorney George Gascon called Uber’s background checks ‘completely
worthless,’. . . . [A]nd several Uber and UberX drivers in the Washington, D.C., area 
said Uber’s background checks were hardly rigorous.”). 
199. Id. (comparing available data on safety for ride-sharing and taxi services). 
200. See Cannon & Chung, supra note 137, at 73 (“Government should take a more 
significant role in regulating activities where a failed transaction implies irreversible high-
risk consequences.”).  The seriousness of potential harm varies across different sectors of
the sharing economy, and a regulatory response may not always be warranted.  For example, a
driveway-sharing service like ParkingPanda typically involves no personal interactions 
and the use of an asset—a driveway or garage—that is not readily susceptible to physical 
damage. See How It Works, PARKINGPANDA, https://www.parkingpanda.com/how-it­
works [https://perma.cc/S7MF-3FDC] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  While damage in the 
driveway-sharing scenario is still possible, for example, from leaking oil or hitting an
adjacent structure while using the driveway, the harms would typically be lower than those 
possible in a failed ride-hailing or home-sharing transaction.
201. Early on, some proponents of the sharing economy resisted categorization of its
activities as commercial ones; however, even early adherents of this view now concede
these activities are in fact commercial.  See, e.g., Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-
Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 116, 116 (2015) (“It [the sharing economy] blurs the line between personal and
professional in the provision of commercial services.”).  While some sharing economy 
platforms, such as Couchsurfing, do not involve a monetary exchange between parties, the 
vast majority of sharing economy activities do involve monetary exchanges and thus 
should be considered commercial, even if users also have other motivations (such as
community-building) in using the sites. See About Us, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couch 
surfing.com/about/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/M7DS-LM3W] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016);
Zale, supra note 3, at 523 (citing CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 50). 
202. See Kuh, supra note 51 (noting that “the home has long been afforded special
status in a variety of legal contexts” and analyzing thin and thick accounts of the significance
 995
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automatically entitle the activity to regulatory immunity on privacy grounds. 
Those working out of their home, for example, still must comply with tax 
and employment laws; many home businesses, such as at-home daycare,
are subject to numerous regulations, from health and safety codes to zoning 
laws.203  While some home-sharing activity, such as short-term rentals
where the host is also staying in the unit, may implicate privacy and
autonomy concerns akin to those raised by roommate selection,204 the vast 
majority of Airbnb hosts rent out entire units, never occupying the space
at the same time as the guests.205  Laws prohibiting discrimination in such 
a scenario—an arms-length, short-term commercial rental between individuals 
who never occupy the space at the same time—do not raise the kind of privacy 
and autonomy concerns that roommate or shared room scenarios do.206 
Third, there are undoubtedly high enforcement costs if cities have to
monitor and enforce regulations like tax obligations or permit registrations 
against the large numbers of individual users, especially when cities lack
a means of determining whether individuals are engaged in the small-scale
activities being regulated.  However, the network orchestrator model of 
the sharing economy offers a way to lower those enforcement costs by re­
focusing regulatory efforts on a single actor: the platform.  In a variety of 
contexts, from environmental law to employment law, regulatory programs
focus on big actors because doing so can lower enforcement costs.  For
example, air quality regulations focus on car manufacturers, not individual 
drivers; by doing so, these regulations achieve their goal of reducing emissions
without having to monitor millions of individual drivers.207 
of the home (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 886 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting))).
203. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the
Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2001) (discussing laws 
applicable to home businesses). 
204. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding the FHA inapplicable to personal roommate selection, because of the serious 
“privacy, autonomy and security” concerns that regulating it would raise).
205. On the breakdown of whole unit versus private room rentals on Airbnb, see 
Scott Shatford, 2015 in Review—Airbnb Data for the USA, AIRDNA (Jan. 7, 2016), http://
blog.airdna.co/2015-in-review-airbnb-data-for-the-usa/ [https://perma.cc/P3WE-LMDV]
(showing data that sixty-three percent of units listed on Airbnb in the U.S. in 2015 were 
entire units; thirty-four percent are private rooms; and three percent are shared rooms). 
206. This is not to say there are no privacy concerns raised by short-term rentals of 
entire units.  Even if I rent my entire unit out on Airbnb, if it is my personal residence that 
I otherwise live in, there are more privacy concerns than with a hotel room.  But the question is
not whether there are any privacy concerns; it is whether privacy concerns are so significant as
to justify exemptions from regulations intending to achieve other important public policies. 
207. See Oren, supra note 60, at 148 (“Technology-forcing—compelling regulated 
industries to seek more effective ways of reducing emissions—has been a hallmark of the 
Clean Air Act since 1970. . . . Changing individual behavior is more complex than regulating
industry.”). 
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Regulators can take a similar approach to the sharing economy.  For 
example, rather than trying to determine if the thousands of short-term rental
hosts in a city each have obtained the necessary permit to engage in the 
activity—an almost Sisyphean task—regulation can focus on the platforms
and require that they include permit numbers on listings posted on their
sites.208  Furthermore, because the big actors in the sharing economy are not 
only facilitators of small-scale transactions but are also aggregators of data 
about small-scale transactions, regulations can also be designed to utilize 
this data to lower enforcement costs.209 
Fourth, fairness concerns that may be raised by regulations that impose 
a disproportionate burden on small-scale actors engaged in sharing and 
ride-hailing can be largely addressed by adopting regulatory approaches 
that are proportional to the regulated activity.  For example, while one­
size—fits-all regulations may be appropriate for background checks for 
ride-hailing drivers, other types of activity, like home-sharing, may be better 
addressed through tiered regulation, such as permit fees or tax obligations 
based on the number of nights the property is used for short-term rentals.210 
Finally, a number of non-legal alternatives, such as norms, markets, and 
architecture, have already emerged to shape and constrain the behavior of 
small-scale actors in the sharing economy.  For example, self-regulatory
systems, such as internal background checks on drivers conducted by Uber 
and Lyft, have been praised as just as, if not more, effective than government- 
mandated fingerprinting requirements.211  The informal norms that mechanisms
such as two-way rating systems can produce have also been touted as more
protective of users than any government intervention.212  Market-based 
208. But see infra text accompanying notes 229–39 (discussing section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) as a potential obstacle to regulations such as this 
which focus on regulating platforms). 
209. Difficult questions remain to be resolved about obtaining access to data and
how privacy concerns should be addressed.  See infra text accompanying notes 250–52. 
210. See discussion infra Sections III.2, III.3. 
211. See Daniel C. Vock, Is Fingerprinting Austin’s Uber and Lyft Drivers Actually 
Safer?, GOVERNING (May 9, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/ 
gov-uber-austin-houston-fingerprinting.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ85-FCVQ] (noting that 
Uber and Lyft have fought fingerprinting regulations in a number of cities and “argue[d] 
that their current system is safer than fingerprinting”).
212. See Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the
Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/10/
from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldn’t-regulate-the-sharing-economy/
[https://perma.cc/T2TF-YXFW] (contending that “[i]n the sharing economy, reputation
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responses have also emerged, with competitors to Airbnb, such as Noirbnb 
and Innclusive, launched after their founders experienced racial discrimination
on Airbnb.213 
However, the existence of alternatives to formal legal regulation does
not mean that legal governance is unnecessary.  As Jane Winn has noted
in her scholarship on Amazon and consumer protection, there are public 
goods that private regulation, whether in the form of norms, architecture, 
or markets, will fail to adequately address because “private regulators can
focus on maximizing value to shareholders while avoiding the broad range 
of duties a national legal system must accommodate.”214  Furthermore, 
regulation of behavior by mechanisms other than formal legal regulation 
“is not normally legitimated by the same mechanisms as government
regulation: representative democracy or judicial review.”215  Not only do
non-legal alternatives lack the transparency and democratic processes of
formal legal regulation, they may result in parties who have little or no 
voice in the process bearing the brunt of the costs.216 
While a full analysis of alternatives to legal regulation in the sharing 
economy could be the subject of an entire separate article, the example of
two-way rating systems can illustrate why relying on alternatives to legal
regulation in lieu of legal regulation may be problematic.  Two-way ratings
systems on platforms like Airbnb can potentially reduce socially undesirable
behavior because negative reviews serve as a form of non-legal sanction. 
The user can be removed from the network by the platform orchestrator,217 
or be effectively prevented from engaging in activities on the network 
because other users can see the negative reviews.218  Especially when the
platform is the largest one, and thus the most desirable for users to belong 
serves as the digital institution that protects buyers and prevents the market failure that
economists and policy makers worry about”). 
213. See Harpaz, supra note 28. 
214. Jane K. Winn, The Secession of the Successful: The Rise of Amazon as Private 
Global Consumer Protection Regulator, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 196 (2016). 
215. Id. at 209. 
216. Id. (“Amazon’s intense focus on customer satisfaction combined with its status
as a private regulator currently permit it to externalize many of the costs of achieving high 
levels of customer satisfaction onto those stakeholder groups [employees and suppliers] 
most excluded from its governance processes.”). 
217. Uber apparently suspends drivers whose rating goes below 4.6 (out of five). 
See Jack Smith IV, Uber Drivers: The Punishment for Bad Ratings Is Costly Training 
Courses, THE OBSERVER, (Feb. 3, 2015, 2:25 PM), http://observer.com/2015/02/uber­
drivers-the-punishment-for-bad-ratings-is-costly-training-courses/ (noting that a bad review is
not always the result of bad service, but “can come any time: a passenger could be having 
a bad day, or if you’re a woman, a drunk passenger could give you a low rating after you
rebuff his entitled attempts to hit on you.”). 
218. See Aviram, supra note 145, at 1197 (“The network’s ability to exclude a member
may therefore be a powerful sanction.”). 
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to in order to take advantage of network effects,219 this form of sanction 
can be particularly powerful.
On the other hand, two-way reviews may exacerbate socially undesirable 
behavior: internet comments, even non-anonymous ones, are a forum ripe
for racism, sexism, and other “isms.”220  Furthermore, because studies have
shown that two-way reviews skew positive, the effect of just one negative 
review—for what may have been a mistake or misunderstanding—can
have disproportional consequences.221 Finally, even where two-way reviews
effectively constrain some aspects of users’ behavior, such as cleanliness 
of a car or house, they do not address behavior that may be more troubling 
from a public safety perspective. While a friendly Airbnb host with a clean 
house may garner five-star reviews from users, if she has failed to install
smoke detectors, members of the public will not be protected by ratings 
systems alone.222 
This is not to say formal legal regulation should be the only governance 
response to the sharing economy.  Alternatives to legal regulation may
effectively address numerous aspects of home-sharing and ride-hailing. 
But while non-legal mechanisms can help address negative cumulative 
impacts and regulatory fractures, they are unlikely to be able to do it alone. 
Non-legal responses to discrimination on Airbnb, like the creation of
Innclusive and Noirbnb, or Airbnb’s hiring of Eric Holder to craft a new
anti-discrimination policy for the company, should be applauded.223  But
 219. See id. at 1182–83 (discussing how “network effects make certain mechanisms 
far more effective in enforcing norms”). 
220. See Nancy Leong, The Sharing Economy Has a Race Problem, SALON (Nov. 2,
2014, 33:58 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/02/the_sharing_economy_has_a_race_ 
problem/ [https://perma.cc/PC8C-5GXW] (raising questions about both explicit and implicit 
bias against minorities in online user reviews and the impact that they may have on minority
groups); see also Harpaz, supra note 28 (describing discriminatory behavior that minority
users of Airbnb have experienced). 
221. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Ratings Now Cut Both Ways, So Don’t Sass Your Uber
Driver, N.Y. TIMES ((Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/technology/
companies-are-rating-customers.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0 (noting concerns from scholars 
about inaccurate two-way ratings potentially leading us into to a “disinformation economy”); 
Georgios Zervas et al., A First Look at Online Reputation on Airbnb, Where Every Stay Is 
Above Average (Apr. 28, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554500 [https://perma.cc/ 
3Z8M-CHVN] (“[N]early 95% of Airbnb properties boast an average user-generated rating of
either 4.5 or 5 stars (the maximum); virtually none have less than a 3.5 star rating.”).
222. Cf. Sundararajan, supra note 212. 
223. Abha Bhattarai, Airbnb Hires Eric Holder to Help Company Fight Discrimination, 
WASH. POST (July 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/07/20/ 
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concluding that formal legal governance is therefore superfluous is much
like saying that market responses, such as the Green Book, were an adequate 
response to discrimination against African Americans in the Jim Crow
era, making civil rights laws unnecessary.224 
*****
 
While the sharing economy offers social and economic benefits to
participants, the public, and platforms, the large numbers of small-scale
home-sharing and ride-hailing activities that platforms like Uber and Airbnb
have facilitated can result in negative cumulative impacts and produce 
regulatory fractures that may undermine important public policy goals. 
Furthermore, justifications for regulatory leniency do not apply with full
force to small-scale activities like home-sharing and ride-hailing, making 
governance both appropriate and necessary.  The next Part considers what 
kind of specific governance mechanisms can effectively respond to 
implications of scale of the sharing economy.
III. REGULATING SCALE IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
Whenever novel activities emerge, existing regulation must either yield 
or adapt to them.  In the case of the sharing economy, some existing regulations 
should clearly yield; taxi medallion requirements, for example, have been
shown to be largely protectionist and the result of industry capture.225 But 
other existing regulations—such as anti-discrimination laws, consumer 
protection laws, and environmental laws—serve important public policy
goals, and can address the negative cumulative impacts of large numbers
of small-scale home-sharing and ride-hailing activities.  This Part proposes
four specific ways in which governance can adapt and respond to scale in
the sharing economy: (1) co-regulation; (2) aggregate regulation; (3) scalar 
regulation; and (4) cooperative regulation.
eric- holder-joins-airbnb-to-help-company-fight-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/VK8Y­
R5WS].
224. See Gillian B. White, Revisiting a Jim Crow-Era Guide for Traveling While 
Black, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/ 
jim-crow-green-book-mlk/424467/ [https://perma.cc/22HC-G7D7] (describing the Green 
Book, a travel guide series “created to help black Americans travel safely through a segregated
and often unsafe country during the years of Jim Crow. . . . . [T]he severity of the racial 
segregation that made these publications necessary can be difficult to grasp. . . .  ’You
needed the “Green Book” to tell you where you can go without having doors slammed in 
your face.’” (quoting former NAACP chairman Julian Bond)). 
225. See Schneiderman, supra note 197 (“Uber has been an agent for change in an 
industry that has long been controlled by small groups of taxi owners. The regulations 
and bureaucracies that protect these entrenched incumbents do not, by and large, serve the 
public interest.”).
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Before unpacking the specifics of these proposals, I address two overarching 
issues. First, the question of which level of government—federal, state, 
or local—should enact these proposals is one that deserves fuller treatment in
a future paper; however, some preliminary observations may be useful to
mention here.  Local regulators have been most active to date in responding
to the sharing economy.226 This local focus makes sense because local 
communities have different housing markets and transportation sectors: 
the rental market in San Francisco is different than that in Galveston, Texas, 
just as transportation concerns in Washington, D.C. are different than 
those in Orlando, Florida.  Different localities will experience the effects 
of the sharing economy differently, and thus the matching principle would 
suggest that regulation at the local level is most efficient.227 Especially 
considering that the sharing economy is an evolving sector, and that regulations 
will likely require re-evaluation as underlying activities evolve, local 
governance may be more conducive to such experimentation and adaptation.228 
Second, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act potentially 
complicates the regulatory response to scale.  Section 230 preempts any 
state or local law that imposes liability on “interactive computer service[s],”
 226. See generally Nestor Davidson and John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016) (discussing how the regulatory
response to the sharing economy has primarily been at the local level). 
227. The matching principle suggests that the regulatory oversight of an activity
should be matched to the externalities caused by that activity. See Henry N. Butler & 
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (defining
the matching principle as suggesting that “the size of the geographic area affected by a
specific pollution source should determine the appropriate governmental level for responding
to the pollution”).
228. See, e.g., Zale, supra note 3, at 576–77 (“[T]he rapidly evolving nature of 
technological innovation in the sharing economy means that crafting a regulatory response 
will necessarily entail keeping pace with changing technology.”).  However, where uniformity
across jurisdictions is desirable, such as insurance requirements for ride-hailing drivers, 
regulatory responses may be more appropriately undertaken through state regulation.  And
for those aspects of the sharing economy with connection to existing federal laws, such as 
intellectual property law and fair housing laws, federal regulation may be appropriate. For 
example, clarifications to the FHA’s Mrs. Murphy exception or the extent of the CDA 
Section 230 immunity.  Other considerations relevant to the question of which level of government 
is best suited to regulate a particular issue include: the institutional competencies of the
relevant level of government; the availability of resources for enforcement; scaling of the 
level of government to match the scale of the regulated activity; concern about public 
choice and regulatory capture at different levels of government.  See Arnold, supra note 
115, at 336–38. 
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for the publication or speech of another “information content provider.”229 
Section 230 thus provides immunity to websites like Yelp or Craigslist for 
users’ discriminatory or libelous posts.230  While a full discussion of the
implications of Section 230 for the sharing economy is beyond the scope
of this paper, the law poses an obstacle to regulations targeting platforms 
like Airbnb or Uber. For example, when San Francisco recently amended 
its home-sharing ordinance to prohibit platforms from collecting fees for
listings on their site that lack valid city-issued short-term rental registration 
numbers,231 Airbnb sued, claiming that Section 230 preempted the local
ordinance.232 
While Section 230 has proven highly protective of internet companies 
in the past, the law may not provide the kind of blanket immunity from 
regulation that Airbnb seeks.  While the CDA protects internet companies 
from liability based on third party content, if a law imposes liability for 
conduct—such as platforms collecting fees for transactions involving 
unpermitted hosts, as San Francisco’s law does—CDA immunity arguably
should not attach.233  In addition, if an internet company is “responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
229. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).  “The term ‘information content provider’ means 
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012). 
230. See, e.g., Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., Nos. C-10-1321EMC, C-10-2351EMC, 2011 WL 
5079526, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (holding Yelp immune from suit under state law
for alleged manipulation of third-party reviews). 
231. San Francisco amended the ordinance after the previous version (which had 
previously required hosts to register and obtain a permit) was decried as “unworkable” and 
uncomplied with because regulators lacked access to data to determine if hosts were
actually registered as required. See Emily Green, SF Supes Crack Down on Unregistered
Short-Term Rentals, S.F. GATE (June 7, 2016, 9:18 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/ 
article/Supervisors-No-unregistered-hosts-on-short-term-7969444.php [https://perma.cc/
WB9Z-TFED] (noting “only roughly 1,400 of the estimated 7,000 or more residents who
rent their homes and rooms have” registered); Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, ‘No Way of
Enforcing’ Airbnb Law, S.F. Planning Memo Says, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2015), http:// 
www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/No-way-of-enforcing-Airbnb-law-S-F­
planning-6151592.php [https://perma.cc/GYT8-NDHE].
232. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Airbnb, Inc. v. City
of San Francisco, No. 3:16-cv-03615 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2016) [hereinafter Airbnb
Complaint] (“By requiring Airbnb to verify that each third-party rental listing has a valid 
registration number prior to posting the listing on their websites, and by imposing criminal 
and civil penalties for websites’ publishing of unverified third-party listings, the Ordinance
violates the CDA, which preempts the enforcement of these provisions against Airbnb.”).
The complaint also alleges that the city’s ordinance violates the Stored Communications 
Act and the First Amendment. Id. at 1. 
233. See San Francisco’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 8-11, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 
No. 3:16-cv-03615-JD (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2016). 
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provided,” then immunity does not attach.234  Thus, the Ninth Circuit has
held that the roommate-matching website, Roommates.com, was not entitled 
to Section 230 immunity for alleged violations of the FHA because it
developed and designed its website to allow users to input preferences 
about sex or familial status of potential roommates.235  Companies like Airbnb 
and Uber, who exercise extensive control over their platform design, may 
be vulnerable to characterization as content providers and therefore may
not receive Section 230 immunity.236 
Furthermore, even if Section 230 could be construed broadly enough to 
provide immunity to sharing economy companies from things like San
Francisco’s home-sharing ordinance or the FHA, policymakers should 
consider whether it should. We are no longer at the edge of the digital frontier 
as we were in 1996, when Section 230 was enacted.237  As New York’s Attorney
General pointed out, we are fully “living in an online world.”238  Unless 
we want that world to be a world without consumer protection laws, anti-
discrimination laws, and environmental laws, the applicability of Section 
230 to sharing economy companies should be handled with care.239 
234. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1172 (9th 
Cir.2008) (“Roommate is directly involved with developing and enforcing a system that 
subjects subscribers to allegedly discriminatory housing practices.”).
235. Id.at 1169.  The website was ultimately not found liable for violations of the 
FHA on different grounds. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 
1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the term “dwelling” as used in the FHA did not
include shared living space, and therefore that the FHA was inapplicable to roommate 
selection).
236. See also Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“While an overt creation of content is easy to identify, determining what makes a 
party responsible for the ‘development’ of content under § 230(f)(3) is unclear, and the 
CDA does not define the term.  Accordingly, courts often look to the totality of the 
circumstances in making the determination.”). 
237. See Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down this Liability Shield, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-this-liability­
shield/ [https://perma.cc/AM2Q-N5UE] (“It was passed in 1996, when the Internet was 
still a novelty rather than an integral element of commerce and daily communication for 
pretty much all Americans.”).
238. Schneiderman, supra note 197. 
239. See Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 COLO. TECH.
L.J. 149, 165 (2015) (discussing calls to reform Section 230 (citing Letter from Chris 










































Much of the current regulatory response to the sharing economy attempts
to force existing regulatory models onto activities occurring in the sharing
economy.240  While some existing modes of regulation may translate onto 
the sharing economy, the sharing economy’s three-sided model of platforms, 
users, and providers is a poor fit with much existing regulation.241  A more
effective regulatory approach would take advantage of the sharing economy’s
three-sided model through the development of co-regulatory forms of
governance. 
Co-regulation refers to a collaborative regulatory effort that utilizes 
industry to implement regulatory standards.242  Co-regulatory models have
been utilized in a range of legal contexts, from international trade law to 
environmental law, and offer a number of benefits.243  Co-regulation harnesses 
the “unique competence[s]” companies often have in terms of expertise about 
their industry and internal structures.244  By delegating partial regulatory 
responsibilities to companies, government  could be relieved from 
implementation and enforcement responsibilities that would be duplicative of
 240. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
 241. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
 242. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT­
GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 27 (2002) (“[Co-regulation is a] hybrid policy
instrument involving a combination of government-set targets and industry-based implementation,
with even the latter element being underpinned by government controls” (citing NEIL
GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION 50–56 (1998))).  While the terms self-regulation and
co-regulation are sometimes used interchangeably, the two are distinct concepts.  See id.
at 27–28 (distinguishing co-regulation from self-regulation, which “involves giving industry
very considerable autonomy in relation to both goal-setting and implementation”).  While
self-regulation may be appropriate under certain circumstances, it involves significant 
risks; most glaringly, that the regulated entities will not effectively regulate themselves, as 
was the situation in the securities markets prior to the financial crisis of 2008. Cf. Arun
Sundararajan, Trusting the ‘Sharing Economy’ to Regulate Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2014, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/trusting-the-sharing­
economy-to-regulate-itself/?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/4X32-VBVH] (suggesting the securities
industry’s self-regulatory organizations as a model for the self-regulation by sharing economy
companies).  Co-regulation attempts to mitigate some of these risks by retaining more government
involvement in the governance response than self-regulatory models do.  GUNNINGHAM &
SINCLAIR, supra at 27–28. 
243. See, e.g., Paul Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private 
Monitoring of Labor Conditions, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 49, 50 (2011); Maria Savasta-Kennedy,
The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C.
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 857 (2009); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental 
Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 133 (2013). 
244.  Cannon & Chung, supra note 137, at 61. 
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and less productive than those that industry already engages in and can 
instead turn to other areas where government oversight is more necessary.245 
Co-regulatory governance recognizes the reality that private companies 
like Airbnb and Uber are already becoming de facto regulators of certain 
sectors: Airbnb is approaching a role as the de facto regulator of spare
housing capacity, and Uber and Lyft are becoming de facto regulators of 
quasi-public transportation.  However, to date, these companies are largely 
not accepting the responsibilities that come with being regulators, such as 
the need for transparency and accountability.  By engaging platforms as 
partners, co-regulatory models offer a possible way of better aligning territorial 
and functional governance.
Co-regulatory models are also particularly appropriate to the sharing 
economy because of its network orchestrator model. As discussed above, 
norms created and enforced by networks can be more effective constraints 
on individual behavior than direct legal regulation of individuals.246  Networks 
can enforce sanctions against users that “may rival or surpass the government’s 
sanctions in their effectiveness, thus deterring opportunism,” such as making
two-way feedback available to all members, or removing from membership 
users who violate network norms.247  Furthermore, “[w]hen members transact 
mostly over the network’s transacting facilities, an ancillary byproduct is 
that the network can monitor the transactions quickly and accurately at 
low cost.”248 
The rapidly evolving nature of the sharing economy also makes co-regulation
models attractive.  Traditional, top-down regulation typically takes time 
245. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 242, at 27–28 (describing co-regulation
as a “strategy that leaves the government free to focus on its core business of setting policy 
directions and establishing safety standards”); see also Sundararajan, supra note 242 (“As 
hundreds of new peer-to-peer marketplaces emerge over the coming years, such organizations
would ease what would otherwise be a tremendous strain on the government’s resources: 
having to constantly monitor and correct regulatory misalignment across an evolving set 
of industries.”). 
246. See Lessig, supra note 80, at 662–63 (explaining how norms, markets, and
architecture can be both indirect formal legal regulation, as well as stand-alone direct forms 
of regulation).
247. Aviram, supra note 145, at 1190; see also supra text accompanying 210–19. 
248. Aviram, supra note 145, at 1205; see also Winn, supra note 214, at 199 (“A 
successful platform operator is not merely the manager of activity taking place on the platform,
but also one of the regulators governing that activity.  A platform operator’s power as a 
private regulator may be amplified by network effects . . . .” (citing Jane K. Winn, Technical 
Standards as Data Protection Regulation, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 91 (Serge
Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009)).
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to draft and enact; by the time a regulation goes into effect, the underlying 
activities in the sharing economy may have changed significantly.249 By
shifting some of the regulatory responsibility to platforms—who can adapt 
quickly and cheaply to the evolving nature of the sharing economy because
they control the platforms and most of the underlying technology— 
governments can reduce costs of frequent regulatory updates and preserve
their limited budgets for other important public needs.
Furthermore, co-regulation models can at least partially address concerns
that data collection raises regarding privacy, competition, and efficiency. 
Good regulation—predictable, enforceable regulation that responds to the 
social bad at issue—depends on having accurate information about “Who 
did what, where?”250  However, the platforms typically hold this type of
information—data about how many nights someone rents their house on 
Airbnb or how many units in total are rented out in a city during a particular 
time period, for example.  And while platforms like Airbnb and Uber like 
to encourage sharing among their users, they are less inclined to share data 
with regulators.  While most refusals have centered on concerns about user
privacy,251 even where regulators have requested only anonymized data,
platforms such as Airbnb and Uber have almost universally refused to
cooperate until a court order requires them to do so.252
 249. See Zale, supra note 3, at 577 (“[T]he rapidly evolving nature of technological 
innovation in the sharing economy means that crafting a regulatory response will necessarily
entail keeping pace with changing technology.”); see also CITIES, THE SHARING ECONOMY,
AND WHAT’S NEXT, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES 30 (2015), http://www.nlc.org/Documents/Find%
20City%20Solutions/City-Solutions-and-Applied-Research/Report%20-%20%20Cities%
20the%20Sharing%20Economy%20and%20Whats%20Next%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5ABN-P4RH] (noting that lawmaking’s “iterative process can be time-consuming and frustrating.
Cities that tackle regulation in a piecemeal manner may find themselves continually rewriting 
legislation”).
250. Lessig, supra note 31, at 39.  The use of big data for governance—known in the 
literature as “smart cities”—and the privacy issues raised, are issues that reach far beyond 
the sharing economy, and there is a burgeoning scholarship in the area.  See, e.g., Kelsey
Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected
Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1583–90 (2014); Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal
Environmental Information: The Promise and Perils of the Emerging Capacity to Identify 
Individual Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1565, 1569–70 (2012).
251. While publicly citing privacy concerns, platforms’ general unwillingness to release
data likely hinges as much on competitive concerns, because the massive amount of data 
they are collecting is likely of significant value.  See Tom Lee, The Sharing Economy’s Dirty 
Laundry, JACOBIN (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/03/uber-airbnb­
sharing-economy-housing-tech/ [https://perma.cc/G9N2-ZSPZ].
252. Tomio Geron, New York State AG Seeks Airbnb Data on Hosts in Legal Battle, 
FORBES (Oct. 7, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/10/07/
new-york-state-ag-seeks-airbnb-data-on-hosts-in-legal-battle/ [https://perma.cc/52R9-T7AC]
(quoting an Airbnb blog post about the Attorney General’s request: “We always want to 
work with governments to make the Airbnb community stronger, but at this point, this
demand is unreasonably broad and we will fight it with everything we’ve got.” (quoting 
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While data collection raises legitimate concerns about both privacy and 
competition, traditional regulatory approaches will likely fail without access
to the data that the platforms hold.  For example, just six months after San
Francisco enacted its home-sharing ordinance, and less than two months
after it went into effect, the City Planning Department decried it as
“unworkable” and indicated that the department lacked the resources or
access to information—held by Airbnb—necessary to enforce the law.253 
Particularly when many communities face other significant public needs,
from infrastructure to schools and police, the costs of attempting to enforce
regulations against large numbers of individuals engaged in home-sharing
and ride-hailing may simply not add up.254  Lacking data from platforms,
many cities have been forced to rely on municipal enforcement departments
with small staffs and limited budgets to engage in what amounts to undercover 
investigations.255  The result is complaint-driven enforcement of traditional, 
top-down regulation, which can be sporadic, as well as potentially illegal.256 
And while such an approach may result in responses to the most flagrant
Fighting for You in New York, AIRBNB ACTION (Oct. 6, 2013), https://www.airbnbaction.
com/fighting-for-you/)/ [https://perma.cc/9M59-P3YW])); see also Nathaniel Minor, Airbnb 
Hosts, Denver Regulators Search for Middle Ground, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.cpr.org/news/story/airbnb-hosts-denver-regulators-search-middle-ground [https:// 
perma.cc/9KSD-MXZE] (noting that cities “are having trouble enforcing [regulations].
Airbnb and its peers don’t share internal data with regulators, so officials ‘don’t know who 
to go after”).
253. See Matier & Ross, supra note 231 (citing the lack of access to Airbnb’s booking 
data, to ensure hosts on the site are actually registered with the City).
254. See Rob Walker, Airbnb Pits Neighbor Against Neighbor in Tourist-Friendly 
New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/business/
airbnb-pits-neighbor-against-neighbor-in-tourist-friendly-new-orleans.html (describing the
challenges facing New Orleans’s attempts to enforce its short-term rental restrictions: “New 
Orleans, like most cities, has more urgent priorities—including an understaffed police force 
and road and infrastructure problems that would cost billions to fix.”).
255. See, e.g., Matier & Ross, supra note 231 (discussing the enforcement failures 
of San Francisco’s short-term rental law); see also Walker, supra note 254 (describing the 
New Orleans’s mayor’s acknowledgment that enforcement of that city’s “short-term rental
law has been ‘lax and difficult.’ Listings on home-sharing platforms do not reveal specific 
names and addresses, and identifying and building cases against violators would involve 
considerable time and money, city officials say”).
256. See Associated Press, Honolulu Hit with Lawsuit over Enforcement of Rental 
Units, WASH. TIMES, July 14, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/14/
honolulu-hit-with-lawsuit-over-enforcement-of-rent/ [https://perma.cc/S69B-KWMW] (describing
a lawsuit by a coalition of short-term rental operators against the city of Honolulu for
alleged trespassing during city investigations of properties for violations of the city’s zoning 
laws).
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violations, it fails to address the negative cumulative impacts of the vast
majority of the small-scale activity. 
A co-regulatory model, however, can address platforms’ concerns about 
data by allowing the platforms a certain amount of control over data as
long as they meet regulatory goals, while also relieving government from 
inefficient attempts to replicate the information necessary to enforce 
regulations.  While oversight mechanisms such as audits may be necessary
to ensure that the platform is implementing the regulation as required, co-
regulation is likely to involve less of an intrusion into the data held by
platforms than traditional regulatory models.257 
A handful of co-regulatory models have already begun to emerge.  For
example, in a growing number of jurisdictions, Airbnb now directly collects
the jurisdiction’s transient occupancy tax from users.258  The company 
automatically calculates and collects the tax when a guest books a room 
through the website, and the company remits the tax to the city.259  Airbnb
thus acts as a co-regulator with respect to tax collection, requiring users
to pay the tax as part of the booking process on the website and then remitting 
the aggregate taxes collected to the city. 
While becoming a co-regulator in this way is not costless to platforms,
the benefits of co-regulation to the platforms—greater control of data and 
in how regulatory outcomes are achieved, as well as potential advantage over 
market competitors—might be expected to result in platforms embracing
co-regulatory roles.260  However, sharing economy platforms have not eagerly
assumed a co-regulatory role. For example, until recently, Airbnb disclaimed
any responsibility in the majority of locations in which it operates for 
collecting local occupancy taxes and simply posted a notice on its website 
that users are responsible for compliance with all applicable laws.261 
257. Furthermore, the amount of data sharing economy companies are permitted to
retain under a co-regulation should also be balanced against the needs of government to
access that data in order to better ensure that regulations are being effectively implemented. 
258. Badger, supra note 163.  The complete list of jurisdictions where Airbnb collects 
and remits taxes is available on Airbnb’s website.  In What Areas Is Occupancy Tax 
Collection and Remittance by Airbnb Available?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/
653/in-what-areas-is-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-by-airbnb-available [https://perma.
cc/EN7E-WFRX] (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
259. Badger, supra note 163.
260. For example, the platform might have to create the necessary software to implement
the regulation, and it may lose some users who don’t want to pay the tax to other platforms,
such as Craigslist, that don’t charge the tax as part of the online transaction.  However, 
websites such as Craigslist do not have the trust verification advantages of Airbnb, such 
as user reviews or integrated online payment systems, so users may find that paying the
tax is preferable to those risks. 
261. See What Is Occupancy Tax? Do I Need to Collect or Pay It?, AIRBNB, https://
www.airbnb.com/help/article/654/what-is-occupancy-tax—do-i-need-to-collect-or-pay-it?topic 
=264 [https://perma.cc/2JF9-A33M] (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (“Occupancy tax is generally
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While Airbnb’s attitude toward cooperating with local governments in the
collection of taxes is changing,262 other home-sharing platforms, like
HomeAway and VRBO, continue to resist doing so.263  And neither Airbnb
nor other home-sharing or ride-hailing platforms have indicated interest
in co-regulation with respect to other areas, such as permit requirements,
zoning laws, or fingerprinting.264  Instead, they have responded with lawsuits 
and multi-million dollar ballot campaigns against such regulatory efforts.265 
Part of the resistance to co-regulatory roles stems from the fact that
regardless of the advantages, co-regulation imposes more responsibilities 
and costs on platforms than they currently have.  For example, when the 
City of San Francisco attempted to enlist short-term rental companies as 
co-regulators by prohibiting platforms from collecting fees for listings 
without valid permits from the city, Airbnb responded by suing the city.266 
While the company’s legal claims center around the CDA and the First 
Amendment, the underlying reason for the lawsuit is more straightforward:
paid by the guest, but the obligation to remit the taxes to the government usually falls on
the host. We expect all hosts to familiarize themselves with and follow their local laws 
and regulations.”). 
262. See Alison Griswold, Why Airbnb Desperately Wants to Pay Hotel Taxes, 
SLATE (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/ 
02/airbnb_hotel_taxes_why_does_the_sharing_economy_startup_want_to_pay_them.html.
[https://perma.cc/TWB6-277R].
263. See, e.g., Steve Law, City Cracking Down on Short-Term Rental Companies
and Hosts for Failing to Pay Taxes, Get Inspections, PORTLAND TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2015, 
12:07 AM), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/277870-154116-city-cracking-down­
on-short-term-rental-companies-and-hosts-for-failing-to-pay-taxes-get-inspections [https:// 
perma.cc/HTB4-M6AB] (describing a lawsuit filed by Portland against VRBO.com for failing
to collect and remit taxes and failing to display permit numbers on listings).
264. See Walker, supra note 254 (describing home-sharing companies’ rejection of 
a proposed co-regulatory model requiring platforms to display only listings with valid license 
numbers because it would be “too onerous to adjust their software to accommodate every 
regulatory arrangement for thousands of municipalities around the world;”); see also supra
notes 231–32 and accompanying text (describing Airbnb’s lawsuit against San Francisco
when the city tried to implement precisely such a law).
265. See Camila Domonoske, Uber, Lyft Vow to Stop Driving in Austin After Voters 
Keep Regulations, NPR (May 9, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo­
way/2016/05/09/477310339/uber-lyft-vow-to-stop-driving-in-austin-after-voters-affirm­
regulations [https://perma.cc/QU24-3X64] (describing Uber’s and Lyft’s withdrawal from
Austin, Texas, after voters in the city rejected the companies’ referendum to repeal the city’s 
fingerprinting requirements, despite the companies’ spending more than eight million dollars 
on the effort to repeal the regulations); supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text (describing
Airbnb’s lawsuit against San Francisco). 
266. See Airbnb Complaint, supra note 232. 
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cost. Although adding a field on a website for a license or permit number 
might appear to be a simple “tweak,” Airbnb and other home-sharing
platforms have previously rejected such proposals as a “nonstarter”: “it would 
be too onerous to adjust their software to accommodate every regulatory
arrangement for thousands of municipalities around the world.”267 
However, just as Hilton and Marriott comply with different employment,
land use, and tax laws in the thousands of cities where they operate, multi-
billion dollar companies like Airbnb and Uber should be able to do so as
well.268 
While the platforms’ resistance presents one obstacle to co-regulation, 
local and state governments may also hesitate to entrust platforms with
co-regulatory oversight based on the less than exemplary track record of
some platforms with respect to transparency and full disclosure.269 And 
although co-regulatory approaches like platforms facilitating the collection of
taxes may seem like an easy economic choice, regulators in a number of 
jurisdictions have expressed concerns that legitimizing the tax aspects of 
short-term rentals may undermine other regulatory goals.270  For example,
after Los Angeles adopted a co-regulatory approach for home sharing tax
collection, one city council member cautioned about the specter of regulatory
capture: “We need to let our regulations dictate how much revenue we
receive, and not let potential revenue dictate what sort of regulations we
 267. Walker, supra note 254. 
268. Furthermore, it is possible to conceive of co-regulatory approaches that could 
lower the costs. For example, in the case of home-sharing permits, platforms could be the
issuers of permits themselves.  A city could provide its permit requirements to platforms 
(for example, payment of a twenty-five dollar fee for each platform the host lists on), and 
the platforms could collect the fees from the hosts directly, issue a permit number, and
remit payment to the city. 
269. See, e.g., Amy Plitt, Airbnb May Have Deleted NYC Listings to Bolster Its Image, 
CURBED N.Y. (Feb. 12, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://ny.curbed.com/2016/2/12/11029536/airbnb­
may-have-deleted-nyc-listings-to-bolster-its-image [https://perma.cc/H8KL-GYGT] (noting 
that before Airbnb released data about its New York City listings in November 2015, the 
company deleted one thousand listings for “entire homes” that would have undermined its 
claims that entire units are not being removed from the long-term rental market); see also 
Letter from Brian Schatz, Dianne Feinstein, and Elizabeth Warren, Senators, United States,
to Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n (July 13, 2016), http://www.housing
wire.com/ext/resources/files/Editorial/Files/Letter-to-FTC-re-short-term-rental-platforms-7-13- 
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JCX-BY8A] (noting that while platforms are in the best position 
to provide the data needed to determine their impacts on housing markets, they have been
“reluctant to do so” and “even if platform companies do share their data, concerns have been 
raised about the reliability of this data”). 
270. See Griswold, supra note 262 (quoting Liz Krueger, a New York state senator
who opposed allowing Airbnb to collect and remit taxes: “Paying hotel taxes actually puts 
the ‘hosts’ they claim to care so much about at risk of eviction by providing evidence of
lease violations, and does nothing to alleviate an acute shortage of affordable housing that 
their illegal activity exacerbates.”).
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craft.”271  Yet while concerns such as balancing short-term efficiency gains
with long-term public needs and proper oversight of platforms should be 
part of the conversation about co-regulatory programs, co-regulation deserves 
careful consideration as a regulatory tool that may be well-suited to the
configuration of scale in the sharing economy.
B. Aggregate Regulations 
Aggregate regulations are framed around the aggregate impacts of regulated 
activity.272  In contrast to scaled regulations, discussed in the next Section, 
where the regulatory response is tailored to the amount of activity engaged
in by individual actors, aggregate regulations are designed to respond to 
the overall amount of activity occurring.273  Two recent examples of ride-
hailing regulations provide a useful illustration of how aggregate regulations 
can address the negative cumulative impacts of small-scale activities.
The city of São Paulo, Brazil, which ranks as one of the world’s most 
congested cities, recently announced a plan to charge ride-hailing companies
bimonthly, upfront fees, based on estimates of total miles that drivers travel
in their network.274 The dual goals of this regulation are to ensure that the
companies compensate the city for their “commercial use of [the city’s] public 
road infrastructure, which can then be used to better manage and maintain 
it,” and to create a market for the mileage credits, which the companies can 
then trade.275  By focusing on the aggregate impacts of ride-hailing on traffic
congestion, the regulation addresses the incremental impacts of each additional 
vehicle Uber and Lyft put on the road while putting the costs of monitoring 
that activity on the least-cost avoider—the platforms.
 271. See Emily Alpert Reyes, Airbnb Strikes Deal with L.A. to Collect Millions in 
Lodging Taxes, L.A.TIMES (July 18, 2016, 4:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me­
ln-airbnb-taxes-20160718-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/YN25-NHBH] (quoting Los
Angeles city council member Mike Bonin after the city’s recent decision to allow Airbnb 
to collect and remit taxes from short-term rentals, even though such rentals are currently
illegal in much of Los Angeles).
272. See Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 42, at 1419 (“To confront one percent 
arguments, it is critical to change the frame of reference from a focus on exemptions justified 
individually to a focus on aggregate effects.”).
273. See infra Section III.3.
274. Georges Darido et al., Sao Paulo’s Innovative Proposal to Regulate Shared Mobility 




































Another example of aggregate regulation was enacted in Washington,
D.C. to address the cumulative impacts of ride-hailing on accessibility.  Because 
existing regulatory models for ADA compliance—such as accessible vehicle
percentage requirements for taxis—are ill-suited to the network orchestrator 
model of ride-hailing companies, Washington, D.C. requires that ride-hailing
fares include a surcharge that platforms remit to the city, which uses the
surcharges to ensure adequate accessible transportation in alternate forms.276 
By focusing on the aggregate impacts of ride-hailing on accessibility, the 
regulation aims to ensure that the growing ride-hailing sector does not
undermine public policy interests in accessible transportation for those in
wheelchairs or with other mobility challenges. 
Aggregate regulation like São Paulo’s congestion pricing and Washington, 
D.C.’s accessibility surcharge can be particularly useful where the underlying 
small-scale activity is one that for reasons of autonomy or enforcement
costs is not readily susceptible to regulation.  By regulating the third-party
platform that facilitates the underlying activity, aggregate regulation can
lower the costs of enforcement, as well as help avoid difficult questions 
about balancing individual autonomy against other important public policies. 
However, there are challenges to aggregate regulations.  As discussed 
in Part III(A), obtaining the data needed to develop and enforce regulations
has proven to be a challenge, with platforms that hold the data generally
unwilling to share it with regulators.  For example, a number of cities have 
struggled with enforcing aggregate regulations, such as transient occupancy
taxes or short-term rental permit fees, because they have limited ability to
determine who owes those fees without data from the platforms.277 But 
there may be ways to bring the platforms to the table. Airbnb is increasing 
its cooperation with cities and collecting transient occupancy taxes directly 
through its website in order to legitimize the tax aspects of home-sharing.278 
And even though São Paulo’s congestion pricing regulation requires 
companies to provide anonymized data on “trip origins and destinations, 
times, distances and route of travel, price and service evaluation,”279 Uber
has embraced the plan as far preferable to the complete ban on ride-hailing 
that was the alternative.280
 276. See CITIES, THE SHARING ECONOMY, AND WHAT’S NEXT, supra note 249, at 17
(discussing how Washington, D.C., Chicago and Seattle have enacted these types of regulations).
277. See supra notes 250–52 and accompanying text. 
278. See sources cited supra notes 270–71. 
279. Darido, supra note 274. 
280. Sao Paulo Mayor to Authorize Uber with Mileage Fee, REUTERS (May 10, 
2016, 7:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-brazil-idUSKCN0Y12TL
[https://perma.cc/XV73-EZ8R]. 
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C. Scaled Regulation
Scaled regulations link the level of regulation to the amount of an
individual, small-scale actor’s activity. An example of scaled regulation 
is fee-based regulation, in which regulators charge a fee to those who 
engage in a particular activity to account for externalities imposed by the
activity—and the corresponding regulatory oversight required—and the 
amount of the fee is proportional to the amount of regulated activity engaged
in. For example, home-sharing regulations in Portland, Oregon impose 
minimal permit fees for occasional home-sharing hosts, with higher fees
for hosts who engage in more frequent short-term rentals.281  By tailoring 
the level of regulation to the amount of regulatory activity, scaled regulations 
can respond to fairness concerns that a one-size-fits-all regulation may unduly
burden small-scale actors.  At the same time, scaled regulation can ensure
that the impacts of small-scale activities are accounted for proportionally.
For example, in a jurisdiction with no permitting requirements for short-
term rentals, when someone regularly rents out their apartment for home
sharing through Airbnb, neighboring residents may experience increased
noise or parking congestion, but the host is unlikely to bear the cost of 
these externalities.  If instead the jurisdiction has a scaled permitting system, 
with permit fees tied to the number of nights the host uses the property for 
home-sharing, the system can provide the funds necessary for regulators 
to respond to the externalities that the small-scale activity causes.  By raising 
the costs of engaging in the activity, scaled regulation requires the host to 
internalize at least some of those costs.  Additionally, from an institutional 
design perspective, because scaled regulations are based on quantifiable 
measurements, they can offer the prospect of certainty and efficiency to both 
regulators and the regulated parties. 
As with aggregate regulations, obtaining the data necessary to develop 
and enforce scaled regulation will be a challenge without the cooperation 
of platforms that hold this data.  If regulators have no way of determining 
how many nights a year a host engages in short-term rentals, then regulators
281. Portland, Oregon’s regulations were to allow owners/renters of houses and duplexes
to “rent one or two bedrooms of their primary home for less than 30 days at a time, if they
get a city inspection and pay a $180 fee once every two years,” rather than the $4,130 fee 
traditional bed and breakfast operators must pay.  Steve Law, Airbnb Rules May Cool City’s 




















   
    
   
     





cannot enforce a scaled regulatory approach that sets varying tiers of permit 
fees based on the number of nights a host rents out their property.  To respond 
to this concern, co-regulatory models such as those discussed above should 
be considered together with scaled regulatory models.
D. Cooperative Regulation
A final governance mechanism to respond to scale in the sharing economy
is cooperative regulation. A cooperative is a form of business ownership 
in which the members—consumers who patronize the business, producers 
who supply the business, workers who work at the business, or some
combination—own and manage the enterprise.282  Cooperatives are 
democratically controlled by their members, operate at cost by returning 
any excess revenues to members, and subordinate capital by limiting investor 
control and returns.283 
Cooperative models provide a tool to address the regulatory fractures 
that the sharing economy’s three-sided model creates.  By substituting 
participant-owned cooperatives for third-party platforms like Uber and 
Lyft, the cooperative model realigns the network orchestrator model: the 
actors themselves now facilitate small-scale activates through their 
cooperative.284  Members have control over and responsibility for the actions 
of the network.  If the aggregate amount of small-scale activity results in 
negative cumulative impacts subject to regulation, the cooperative model 
holds the members responsible.  And the cooperative can return the financial 
benefits of network effects to the members, rather than having them go to
a third-party platform, whose goal of maximizing shareholder profits does 
not necessarily align with the interests of participants.285 
One might question whether a cooperative model is actually viable; after 
all, how can participant-owned cooperatives compete with multi-billion 
dollar companies like Uber and Airbnb?  In fact, the local nature of ride­
282. See ORSI, supra note 47, at 187–93 (providing examples of different types of 
cooperatives and describing key characteristics of cooperatives).
283. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Comm’r, 44 T.C. 305, 308 (1965) (citing these 
“three guiding principles, which still persist as the core of economic cooperative theory”). 
284. In addition to provider- or user-owned cooperative models, publicly-owned
platforms run by municipalities have also been proposed. See, e.g., Introduction, PLATFORM
COOPERATIVISM, http://platformcoop.net/2015/ [https://perma.cc/F2Q5-NKXD] (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2016) (“Could the Internet be owned and governed differently?  What if Uber drivers
could set up their own platform, or if cities could control their own version of Airbnb?”). 
285. See Mike Konczal, Socialize Uber, NATION (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.
thenation.com/article/socialize-uber [https://perma.cc/56VJ-7GHF] (criticizing Uber’s business 
model: the “arrangement means that drivers have to pay for their own cars, maintenance 
and gas, while management sets the rates and terms of their labor, taking a hefty cut in the 
process”). 
1014
ZALE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018 3:43 PM     
  














   
 
   









    






[VOL. 53:  949, 2016] When Everything is Small
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
hailing and home-sharing services actually may lend itself to competition 
from cooperatives, since “a majority of demand from each consumer is 
concentrated in a specific city, making ‘network effects’ from global reach 
[of companies Uber or Airbnb] a less effective barrier to entry.”286 
Furthermore, the biggest barriers to worker cooperatives—up-front capital
and coordinating different types of employees—are absent in the sharing 
economy: users already own most of the capital and engage in the same types
of activities. Furthermore, replicating the underlying technology does not pose 
a significant barrier to entry.287 
Cooperative or driver-equity based peer-to-peer ride-hailing platforms,
as well as driver-owned taxi cooperatives, have emerged in a number of 
cities.288 For example, when Uber and Lyft abandoned the Austin market
in May 2016 after their failed $8 million ballot measure campaign to 
repeal the city’s fingerprinting regulation for ride-hailing drivers, several
other ride-hailing services entered the market, including some services based 
on the cooperative model.289  While regulators should not necessarily mandate
 286. Arun Sundararajan, The New “New Deal”?  Sharing Responsibility in the Sharing 
Economy, POL’Y NETWORK (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail. 
aspx?ID=4762; [https://perma.cc/7WED-BNKC]; see also Tracey Lien, Lyft Defies Predictions
by Continuing to Grow as a Rival to Uber, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016, 3:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-0105-lyft-growth-20160105-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/YLP6-CMUV] (discussing how the “the winner-take-all phenomenon 
that drives so much of the Internet—a theory also known as ‘network effects’—may not 
be as relevant to the transportation industry”).
287. See Konczal, supra note 285 (“The capital owners maintain the phone app, but 
app technology isn’t the major cost, and it’s getting cheaper and easier by the day.”); see 
also David Z. Morris, A Swarm of Startups Are Filling the Uber Void in Austin, FORTUNE
(May 29, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/05/29/uber-alternatives-austin/ [https://
perma.cc/B8XF-TWJ9] (“While a ride-sharing service isn’t necessarily the easiest thing 
in the world to build, it also clearly doesn’t have the kind of technological moat that makes
it irreproducible.”).
288. See, e.g., Sarah Kessler, Inside Juno, the Company that Wants to Beat Uber by
Wooing Its Drivers, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 29, 2016, 6:06 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/
3057182/inside-juno-the-company-that-wants-to-beat-uber-by-wooing-its-drivers [https:// 
perma.cc/MS49-B5PF] (“Juno has reserved half of its founding shares for drivers (they’ll 
be diluted as investors come on board, but no more so than Juno’s four founders’ shares).”); see 
also About, UNION TAXI COOPERATIVE, http://www.uniontaxidenver.net/about/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HL8V-KD7H] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (describing Denver’s driver-owned 
Union Taxi); The Union Difference, TRANSUNION CAR SERV., http://www.ridetcs.com/# 
union_difference [https://perma.cc/R4SJ-AC54] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (describing
New Jersey’s driver-owned Transunion taxi). 
289. Susan Johnston Taylor, A World Without Uber, ATLANTIC (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/a-world-without-uber/487331/ 
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or prefer cooperative forms of sharing economy platforms, they can try to
ensure that laws do not unnecessarily burden cooperative business models 
and explore whether there are ways to make cooperative formation more 
accessible.290 
IV. CONCLUSION
The small-scale activities taking place in the sharing economy offer 
enormous potential for economic growth, sustainability and connectivity,
and equity of access.  However, the massive numbers of small-scale activities 
being facilitated by platforms is also resulting in negative cumulative impacts 
and regulatory fractures—from the loss of long-term rental housing to
discrimination against protected classes to increased burdens on public 
services and infrastructure.  By unpacking the role of scale in the sharing 
economy and proposing a prescriptive framework for recalibrating regulatory 
responses, this Article offers insights for both policymakers grappling 
with the economic and social impacts of home sharing and ride-hailing in 
their communities and for those who wish to develop a deeper understanding
the role of scale in governance.
[https://perma.cc/9KL3-4RVV] (describing numerous ride-hailing services that have emerged 
to fill the Austin market since Uber and Lyft’s departure).
290. For example, Austin, Texas, a city with more than forty cooperative businesses, 
recently passed a resolution “[t]o foster growth of cooperative businesses” in the city. 
Press Release, Nat’l Cooperative Bus. Ass’n, ACBA Partners with Austin City Council in
Resolution to Foster Growth of Cooperative Businesses, https://www.ncba.coop/press­
releases?start=405 [https://perma.cc/2SMB-YHZN] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
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